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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, 
Plaintiff\Appellant, 
vs. 
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE 
# 1743, BENEVOLENT & I 
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, 
Defendant\Appellee 
Case No. 91-0551 
Priority No. 16 
• 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A DECISION GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO DEFENDANT BY THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE PHILIP EVES, JUDGE PRESIDING 
Trial Court Case No. 90-050-3229 
Plaintiff\Appellant, SANDRA BEYNON, by and through her 
counsel of record John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah 
Legal Clinic on behalf of Utah Civil Rights and Liberties 
Foundation, Inc., submits the following BRIEF in support of 
Plaintiff's appeal. 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION 
Appellant ("Ms. Beynon") brings this appeal from a 
decision by the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for 
Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable Philip Eves, 
judge presiding. The Fifth Judicial District Court dis-
missed Beynon7s complaint and granted summary judgment to 
the defendant. Complaint (Exhibit "A" attached); Memorandum 
Decision of November 4, 1991 (Exhibit "B" attached); Judg-
ment of Dismissal of December 3, 1991 (Exhibit "C" at-
tached) . 
Ms. Beynon seeks reversal of that decision and a ruling 
under the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to 
-4 (1953 as amended) ("Utah Civil Rights Act"), Exhibit "E" 
attached, that appellee, St. George - Dixie Lodge # 1743, 
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks ("Elks Lodge") 
unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of gender. 
Ms. Beynon7s timely appeal was filed December 5, 1991. 
Exhibit "D" attached. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OP REVIEW 
I. Issues 
DOES THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, U.C.A. §§ 13-7-1 ET SEQ. 
(1953 AS AMENDED) PROHIBIT THE DEFENDANT ELKS LODGE FROM 
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST MS. BEYNON ON THE BASIS OF HER GEN-
DER? 
2 
1. As a place of business that sells beer to consum-
ers, is the Elks Lodge subject to the anti-discrimination 
mandate of the Utah Civil Rights Act? 
2. As a licensee of the state, entitled to sell liquor 
to its members, and guests, is the Elks Lodge subject to the 
anti-discrimination mandate of the Utah Civil Rights Act? 
3. Is the Elks Lodge a business establishment for the 
purposes of the anti-discrimination mandate of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act? 
4. Does the compelling state interest of eradicating 
invidious discrimination outweigh any constitutional right 
of Elks Lodge members to associate freely? 
II. Standard of Review 
Because the trial court7s rulings on all these issues 
were strictly legal conclusions, this court need accord them 
no deference and should apply a "correction of error" stan-
dard of review. Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 
1154 (Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988). 
3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative in 
this action: 
United States Constitution, First Amendment. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 1. 
Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Annotated §§ 13-7-1 to 
13-7-4 (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated § 16-6-13.1 (1953 as amended) 
(repealed). 
Utah Code Annotated § 32-1-3 (1953 as amended) (re-
pealed) . 
Utah Code Annotated § 32-1-3 6 (1953 as amended) (re-
pealed) . 
Utah Code Annotated § 32A-1-5 (41) (1953 as amended) 
The Appendix to this Brief contains copies of these 
constitutional and statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case arises under the Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), Exhibit "E" 
attached, which prohibits gender discrimination in business 
establishments and in enterprises regulated by the state. 
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Included among regulated enterprises subject to the Act are 
businesses which sell beer or house a state liquor store. 
Ms. Beynon challenges the defendant Elks Lodge's 
rejection of her membership application exclusively on the 
basis of her gender. Because the Elks Lodge is licensed by 
the state to sell beer and alcohol and exhibits other busi-
ness attributes, Ms. Beynon contends that this discriminato-
ry conduct is forbidden by the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
Waiving her claim for monetary damages, Ms. Beynon seeks 
injunctive and declaratory relief against the Elks Lodge. 
As a matter of first impression, this Court must deter-
mine if the defendant Elks Lodge is a business establishment 
for the purposes of this important anti-discrimination 
statute. Additionally, as a matter of first impression, 
this Court must determine if the Elks Lodge is an enterprise 
regulated by the state under this civil rights provision. 
Finally, this Court must determine whether the important 
state interest of eradicating invidious discrimination 
outweighs the constitutional right of Elks Lodge members to 
associate freely. 
II. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Ms. Beynon seeks reversal of the decision by the Honor-
able Philip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and 
for Washington County to dismiss her compliant. Judge Eves' 
5 
ruling was set forth in his Memorandum Decision of November 
4, 1991 (Exhibit "B"), and later embodied in a Judgment of 
Dismissal signed December 3, 1991. Exhibit "C". A notice 
of appeal was timely filed on December 5, 1991. Exhibit 
"D". 
Judge Eves dismissed this action through a summary 
judgment holding that, although the Elks Lodge sells beer to 
its customers, has a state liquor license, and has a city 
business license, it is not a "place of business" nor a 
business establishment for the purposes of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act. Based solely upon the lodge's status as a non-
profit organization, the Judge held that the Elks Lodge was 
free to discriminate against Ms. Beynon on the basis of 
invidious classification. To justify his position, Judge 
Eves relied upon Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 551 P.2d 
465 (Oregon 1976), which maintained, on the basis of unique 
legislative intent, that the Boy Scouts was not a place of 
public accommodation for the purposes of the Oregon Civil 
Rights Act. 
III. Statement of Facts 
With the needed sponsorship of a current lodge member, 
Sandra Beynon applied for membership to the St. George Elks 
Lodge on August 7, 1987. Memorandum Decision at unnumbered 
p. 2, Exhibit "B", T.R. p. 1196. Citing Ms. Beynon's gender 
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as the sole basis for its negative decision, the Elks Lodge 
rejected Ms. Beynon's membership application. Id. Indeed, 
Ms. Beynon met all the Elks Lodge's membership criteria 
except the requirement that all members be male. Complaint, 
5 17. Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 1. Because the Elks Lodge's 
actions constituted unlawful gender discrimination, Ms. 
Beynon brought this action under the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
The St. George Elks Lodge is one of fourteen (14) Utah 
chapters of a nation wide fraternal organization that has 
existed in the United States for more than one hundred 
twenty (120+) years. Complaint, 5 3, Exhibit "A", T.R. p. 
1. Other than excluding females from its membership, the 
Elks Lodge is not particular in its membership selection. 
Memorandum Decision at unnumbered p. 2, Exhibit "B", T.R. p. 
1196, McClellan Depo. at 24, T.R. p. 1255; Truman Depo. at 
12; Foremaster Depo. at 8, 1. 19, T.R. p. 1257. To become a 
member of the Elks Lodge, an individual need only: (a) be a 
male American citizen, (b) be over 21 years of age, (c) 
believe in God, (d) have never committed a crime, (e) be a 
non-communist, (f) be sponsored by at least two members of 
the lodge, (g) be willing to uphold the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, (h) be willing to pledge alle-
giance to the United States and to salute the flag, (i) be 
of good character, and (j) promote fellowship among members 
7 
of the Elks Lodge, Memorandum Decision at unnumbered p. 2, 
Exhibit "B", T.R. p 1196, 
Although these criteria appear to be selective, most, 
if not all, men who apply are admitted to membership. Three 
lodge members testified that during their thirty-one (31), 
thirty eight (38), and twenty nine (29) years of membership, 
they witnessed respectively, no applications, maybe ten (10) 
applications and one (1) application rejected for member-
ship. McClellan Depo. at 24, T.R. p. 1255, Truman Depo. at 
12; Foremaster Depo. at 23 and 8, 1. 19. T.R. p. 1257. From 
January, 1987 through June, 1989, Elks Lodge members 
approved every application for membership presented to 
them.1 Exhibit "M", Weekly Meeting Minutes, T.R. p. 748. 
During those two and one half years, the investigation 
committee, whose duty it was to review the qualifications of 
applicants, never issued a negative report on any applicant. 
Id. 
Other evidence suggests that the relationship between 
Elk Lodge members is not intimate. About ten percent (10%) 
of the membership drops out of the organization each year 
and each year the Lodge increases its membership by fifteen 
percent (15%). Defendant's Interrogatories 55 41 and 42, 
1
 Elks Club procedures indicated that each applicant 
must be review and accepted by an investigation committee 
and then approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the general 
membership before he is accepted as a member. 
8 
(June 8, 1989), Exhibit "6". At various Lodge meetings, 
Lodge members are repeatedly encouraged to recruit new 
membership. Defendant's Interrogatories (June 1989), 5 45, 
Exhibit "7". 
Although the St. George Elks Lodge can recruit members 
from only Washington County, Utah and small adjoining areas 
of Nevada and Arizona, the lodge enjoys a large membership 
of more than one thousand (1,000+) men.2 Defendant's Inter-
rogatories at 55 64 (June 8, 1989), Exhibit "1". This 
figure represents more than 6% of the male population in 
Washington County and more than 8% of the male population in 
St. George City.3 There is no limit on the number of men 
that can be members of the Elks Lodge, (Kahus Depo. at 56, 
11. 1-12, T.R. p. 1259; Defendant's Interrogatories (June 8, 
1989), 5 44, Exhibit "2", and each member pays only a modest 
initiation fee of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) and an 
annual fee of sixty dollars ($60.00) to remain in good 
standing with the lodge. Id. 
2
 In 1988 the membership of the club was 1,012, while 
in 1989 the membership was 1,056. Exhibit "1" attached. 
3
 These calculations are based on a 1988 population 
figure of 38,600 for Washington County and of 25,000 for St. 
George City. Appellant assumed that one-half of these city 
and county residents are male. The percentage is even 
greater in light of the fact that a fair member of residents 
are under the age of twenty-one. 
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The Elks Lodge is licensed and regulated by the state. 
The Lodge has both a St. George City business license, 
(Exhibits "I11 and "L") , and formerly a city beer retailer 
license, (Exhibit "K"), as well as a state private club 
liquor license.4 Exhibit "J". In return for the privilege 
of these government licenses, the Elks Lodge must abide by 
extensive state guidelines that govern the distribution of 
beer and liquor. Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Title 32A, 
Utah Code Ann. (1986) . As is a requisite for all Utah 
establishments to obtain a private club liquor license, the 
Elks Lodge must be non-profit corporation. Ut. Code Ann. § 
32A-5-105 and § 32A-5-107 (26) (1953 as amended). In 
addition, all private clubs licensed by the state must be 
selective in membership. Ut Code Ann. § 32A-5-102(3)(b); § 
32A-5-107(l)-(4) (1953 as amended). 
Far from a profitless or meager operation, the Elks 
Lodge sells more than one-quarter of a million dollars 
($250,000.00+) of liquor annually and has assets that exceed 
one million three hundred thousand dollars ($1,300,000.00+) 
4
 When this action was first commenced, under Utah law 
the sale of beer for on premises consumption was regulated 
by local governments. After 1990, licenses to sell beer for 
on premise consumption are issued exclusively by the state. 
Ut. Code Ann. §§ 32A-10-202 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
A state license for on premises beer consumption 
requires that the permittee have a current city business 
license. Ut. Code Ann. § 32A-10-202(1)(d) (1953 as 
amended). 
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in value. McClellan Depo. at 30, 11. 16-19, T.R. p. 1255; 
Annual Report for 1989 to National Elks Lodge, T.R. p. 748. 
For the 1986 fiscal year, the lodge earned $25,197.00 from 
rental of its facility. Defendant's Tax Returns, T.R. p. 
748. The lodge also employs twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) 
people, (Defendant's Interrogatories at 5 60 (June 8, 1989), 
Exhibit "3"), to serve lunches during the weekdays, dinner 
three (3) nights a week and Sunday brunch. Defendant's 
Interrogatories (June 8, 1989) 55 19, 20, Exhibit "4". 
Members of the Elks Lodge do not associate in a 
cloistered environment. Instead, the Elks Lodge's 
facilities are open to its members, their families and their 
guest. In addition to serving food and beverages to lodge 
customers, the Elks Lodge hosts receptions, meetings and 
parties and rents the facility to the public for similar 
events open to the public. Defendant's Interrogatories 
(August 22, 1988), 55 8 and 36, Exhibit "5"; List of 
Facility Uses, T.R. p. 748.5 Non-members and members alike 
may pay for the food, drink and services they receive at the 
lodge, Id., placing the lodge in direct competition with 
other business in St. George that also sell food and 
beverages. Indeed, Ms. Beynon personally has purchased beer 
5
 For a non-member to rent the facility, she or he 
must simply be sponsored by a member who must be present 
during the event. T.R. p. 1255, McClellan Depo. at 30, 11. 
16-19. 
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and wine at the lodge during the four (4) years prior to her 
application. 
Importantly, the lodge also provides an opportunity for 
members to conduct business and to make important contacts,6 
Members take their customers and clients to the club, 
discussing business deals over lunch or over drinks. 
Foremaster Depo. at 4, 11. 23-24. T.R. p. 1257; Truman Depo. 
at 3 and 6. Members also discuss business with other 
members they meet at the lodge. Foremaster Depo. at 4, 11. 
5-7 and at 5, 11. 6-10, T.R. p. 1257. For example, one 
member sponsored a business meeting for his employer, US 
WEST at the lodge, (Hansen Depo. at 20, 11. 11-16, T.R. p. 
1258), while another sponsored social, business and training 
events at the lodge related to his employment with the St. 
George Police Department. Raburn Depo. at 34, T.R. p. 1256. 
The central purpose of the Elks organization is to 
provide an opportunity for its members to socialize and to 
engage in charitable activities. Defendant's Summary 
Judgment Memo at 38 and 48, T.R. p. 1138. Members admit 
6
 Although provisions enacted by both the national and 
local organization prohibit the use of membership in a Lodge 
for the promotion of commercial matters, business matters 
are discussed and business contacts are made at the lodge 
and during other events sponsored by the St. George Elks 
Lodge. T.R. p. 1258, Hansen Depo. at 6-7 and at 11, 11. 3-
8. Indeed, lodge members patronize the business of other 
members on the basis of contacts made at the lodge. T.R. p. 
1258, Hansen Depo. at 8, 11. 14 et seq.; T.R. p. 1257, 
Foremaster Depo. at 23, 11. 14-22. 
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that the charitable or other functions of the lodge would 
not be diminished by the participation of women as members. 
Kahus Depo. at 18, 11. 4-10, T.R. p. 1259; Hansen Depo. at 
29, 11. 7 14, at 35, 11. 1-15, T.R. p. 1258; Raburn Depo. at 
32, T.R. p. 1256, Foremaster Depo. at 25, 11. 10-14, T.R. p. 
1257. Women are not excluded from any Elks Lodge function 
except the Tuesday nigtyt meetings. McClellan Depo. at 21, 
11. 6-10, T.R. p. 1255. However, the rituals and ceremonies 
preformed at these weekly meetings significantly reinforce 
the commitment of members to one and other, to their 
community service projects and to the moral principals they 
share. Denying women membership in the Elks Lodge restricts 
their participation in lodge and business activities and 
undermines their sense of esteem, individuality, 
independence and self-worth. As a class, not as persons, 
women are categorically denied the full privileges and 
prestige associated with membership in the defendant lodge. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
Every avenue of analysis indicates that the Utah Civil 
Rights Act prohibits the Elks Lodge from discriminating 
against Ms. Beynon on the basis of her gender. Adherence to 
basic rules of statutory construction, attention to legis-
lative intent, and reference to judicial interpretation of 
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similar civil rights provisions in other states mandates 
that the defendant Elks Lodge be prevented from continuing 
its unlawful practice of excluding women from its member-
ship. The Utah Civil Rights Act itself urges broad inter-
pretation and application of its anti-discrimination 
provisions in furtherance of its noble purpose. 
Because it is licensed to sell beer and alcohol to its 
customers, the Elks Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the 
state, subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act. The Utah 
Legislature appropriately determined that the Elks Lodge 
cannot utilize the privilege of a state license to sell beer 
and alcohol and engage in discriminatory practices. There 
is no exemption in this provision for private clubs or non-
profit organizations nor was any exemption contemplated by 
the legislative authors of the provision. 
The recent passage of the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act has not altered the application of the Utah Civil Rights 
Act to the Elks Lodge. The prohibition of discrimination in 
businesses that "house a state liquor store11 referred to an 
arrangement under the former law in which private clubs had 
to lease a small space to the state as a state liquor store 
to sell liquor to their customers. The Elks Lodge once 
housed such a state liquor store. While this system has 
been replaced by a licensing system, the application of the 
14 
Utah civil rights provision defendant Elks Lodge was 
tered. 
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interpretat "business establishments" demandeu i 
Utah Act itself and ador cher states with similar 
j • isions, application this provis: . e Elks Lodge 
is particuJ.it I y appropriate. 
Finally, the defendai : :iqe cannot avoid the 
• nil [-discrimination statute ^ aiding si :i i i id federal and 
state const fiut ional protections of free associatj < >i i, e 
precedent indicates that mpelling state interest of 
-.'oiTibat i nn invidious discrimination • J tne rights of 
lodge membei tu associate freely. Unlike the int -
associations among family members a other distinctly 
private organizations, the Elks Lodgt efficiently public 
to be 1 tnjuj J 1.Mil by i;he state. In addition, trie " ft.uh • 1 it 
Rights Act is content uuut: tvi 1 and infringes upon defendant's 
constitutional rights only incidei 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Elks Lodge is an Enterprise Regulated by the State. 
The Utah Civil Rights Act carefully outlaws gender 
discrimination "by all enterprises regulated by the state of 
every kind whatsoever," Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-3 (1953 as 
amended), and then defines "enterprises regulated by the 
state" as "all places of business which sell beer to 
consumers or house a state liquor store, as permitted by the 
Alcohol Beverage Control Act, Title 32A." Utah Code Ann. § 
13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as amended). While finding that the Elks 
Lodge sells beer to consumers but not deciding whether the 
lodge housed a liquor store, the court below held that the 
Lodge was not a "place of business" under the definition of 
enterprises regulated by the state. This interpretation of 
the Act is inappropriately narrow and incorrect. 
A. The Elks Lodge is Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act 
as a Place of Business that Sells Beer to Consumers. 
There is no indication that the authors of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act intended to define the phrase "all places 
of business which sell beer to consumers" narrowly. Quite 
the contrary, Utah Legislators specifically insisted that 
the Act "shall be liberally construed with a view to promote 
the policy and purposes of the act and to promote justice." 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (1953 as amended). Also inviting 
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broad interpretation is ftu ,- rpose of the Act, "to 
ass 1 citizens full and equal availabi 
goods, services ^cilities", Utah Code Ann. . 
(1953 as amended), which J.I nstrained r\ _-,;yy- notion of 
pi oi:It making. Instead, the Act applies /ision of 
goods, services facilities, all of which are offered by 
non-profit and profit organ wit i i alike. 
1. A narrow interpretation of "places of business" is 
inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act. 
Despite language calling for a 1. .ication of 
the Act, the c'l-w* u.K-w maintained that the Elks : -is 
not a place of business poses of tin- Utah Civil 
FigMt. A1 \ , insisting that because the hilkis i, ;•- is na non-
profit organi ,
 u o e s not operate to create monetary 
profits, and is not open to in«. general public " its 
i it , ; ties are immune from the anti-disci n 
legislation. T.R, p. 1196, Memorandum Decision, unnumbeiid 
p. 5. For several reason malysis is inappropriate. 
Placing significance upon the Elks * re's status as a 
non-profi4 • « lization that is not open :.* + :ie puL 
inconsistent with the oi the Act. All private 
mor clubs in Utah must be non-profit corporations and 
cannot • co cue public. Utah Code Ann, § 3-dA••••-< M M (2) 
and § 32A-5-102(1)(e) (1953 as amended). Unless all private 
liquor clubs, including the Zephyr Club or Green Street 
Social Club, were to be free to engage in invidious 
discrimination, the condition of not being open to the 
public and of being a non-profit organization can not be 
sufficient to exempt a club from civil rights legislation. 
Certainly, the Legislature did not intend to allow the 
Zephyr to exclude African Americans from its membership or 
allow Green Street to deny memberships to men. Given that 
the Utah Civil Rights Act is intended to reach non-profit, 
selective membership organizations, logic dictates that the 
Elks Lodge is not exempt merely because it is non-profit and 
is not open to the public. See, 0'Connor v. Village Green 
Owners Assn.f 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (ruling that non-
profit organizations, such as hospitals, were "business 
establishments" and so subject to the Unruh Civil Rights 
Act.).7 
In addition, the reliance of the trial court herein 
upon Schwenk v. BSA, supra, 551 P.2d 465, to contend that 
"the [Utah] legislature intended to prohibit gender 
discrimination in all places where commercial activities for 
the purposes of making monetary profit and offered to the 
general public are being conducted" is misplaced. T.R. p. 
7
 In Utah many hospitals are non-profit corporations. 
Should they be excluded from coverage of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act? 
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1196, Memorandum Decision, * While the 
Schwenk Court interpreted the language ,i* 0\ L|JH Public 
Accommodat preventing discrimination by 
"businesses or commercial - offer goods or 
-•••vices," Schwenk at 468, the text L , , nt is 
remarkably /ei i .: the Utah Civil Rights 
Act.8 More applicable .. ::i— ..•••- .: - the term 
"business" are better found in Californi Unruh 
Civil Rig: language quite similar to that ol; Mi 
Utah Act. Prompted by bruad .1.1" I absolute language, the 
lifornia Courts have defined the term "IUJSI nous., 
establishment" in the broadest sense reasonably possible, 
Pines v. Tomson, 20^ (Cal.App. • "• * 
196^;, include "all specified priva\ groups 
or orqu.. ' icns" Including "even non-profit organizations, ' 
Id. (citing, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., 662 
P.2d 427, 33 Cal.3d 790 at 795-796 (1983), important 
California ease'- are discussed more thoroughly infra. 
Finally, under closer the ruling in Schwenk 
actually supports Ms. Beynon's claim that tin Elks Lodge is 
8
 The Oregon Public Accommodations Act defines a place 
of public accommodation as "any place or service offering to 
the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or 
privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, 
lodgings, amusements or otherwise." ORS 30.675(1) (1973 
amendment). 
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subject to Utah's anti-discrimination statute. To determine 
that the Boy Scouts in Oregon were not a place of public 
accommodation under the Oregon Public Accommodations Act, 
the Schwenk Court depended heavily upon the unique 
legislative history of the Oregon Act — to the point of 
defining the issue before it as "whether the Oregon 
legislature intended this statute" to reach the Boy Scouts. 
Id. at 469. The Court placed significant weight on the 
testimony of a single legislative witness who suggested that 
the amended Act would not encompass private membership 
organizations such as the YWCA and the YMCA. Id. at 468. 
But see, Schwenk v. BSA, 551 P.2d at 470 (O'Connell, J. 
dissenting) (forcefully objecting that legislative history 
did not substantiate the commercial and non-commercial 
distinction relied upon by the majority). If this Court 
were to use a similar analysis of legislative history to 
determine the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act, it would 
be compelled to adopt a broad notion of enterprises 
regulated by the state. Discussion and debate on the floor 
of the 1973 Utah Senate indicate that the amendment to the 
Act was to prevent gender discrimination by "just about 
everybody" including non-profit, "non-commercial" and "non-
20 
public"9 enterprises such as > b« ,"ll.< f* In! Hearing on H.B. 
1973 Utah Laws 3 3 isuggest 
specifical enterprises regulated ;:: th*-j state" 
included the Alta Club roixu liquor club in 
|:.illt L a k e C i t y - Exhibit "G" attached.) 
Non-profit/ selective membership organizations that are 
semi-private and licensed to sell beer are "places of 
business" regulated by the state. 
A subsequ decision in an Oregon Court, indicates 
that Schwenk does not suppiiI Uu? contention that non-profit 
organizations are not businesses. Interest Lloyd 
Lions Club v. Int. Association of Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 
(Or.App. 1986), petition for dismissed, 740 P.2d 182 
(Oregon 1987), the Oregon Court Appeal Lions 
Club t usiness for rhe purposes f vu- jte^ ,. - bin.:111 
Accommodations Act even v/^~ •- non-profit 
community service organization. Accordix itional 
organizatx - \r r Club t-^ula »\^t expt ^1 
Oregon chapter for vio.: < s C±UD rules restricting 
membership to men. Id. 
9
 These terms are in quotes because, although the 
Fifth Judicial Court believes that private clubs are not 
commercial and are not open to the public, proper analysis 
of their activities indicates that they are indeed 
commercial and open to the public for the purposes of the 
Act, 
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Expressly rejecting the argument that a non-profit 
organization, ipso facto, cannot be a business or commercial 
enterprise, the Court insisted that "[t]here is no automatic 
equivalency between an organization's overriding non-
commercial character and the nature of specific activities 
it undertakes which are independent of its non-commercial 
activities." Id. at 891. Despite the non-commercial nature 
of the Lions Club's benevolent services, other aspects of 
its operations, including its "active promotion and sale of 
memberships and the inducement and consequences of business 
advantages for members" were business and commercial 
activities. Jd. The Court also rejected the contention 
that the Lions Club was exempted under the "distinctly 
private" exception of ORS 30.675(2) because its membership 
criteria was "highly selective": "It is true that the 
membership application process has the appearance of being 
elaborate, formal and structured. But the application 
process is not selective and almost all men who apply are 
admitted to membership." Id. at 889 (quoting the trial 
court with approval). 
Under the analysis adopted in Lloyds Lions Club, the 
defendant Elks Lodge is a business or commercial enterprise 
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that is essentially public.10 Evei Court were 
ctdii l x narrow meaning of "places of business", • 
that tne terr ^ commercial entities, ,:^ . 
Lodge would be constitute such Though a non-profit 
arion, :he Elks Lodge ' clearly commercial. 
Lodge annual- one quarter of a million 
dollars in liquor and provides aai iw : beverage 
services, competing directly with other Hinir nking 
establishments in the St. George area. By selling beer and 
liquor to members and non-member renting its building 
yone sponsored by a member *••* u^ allow to 
stage business CM, I i.v i t Les for their employers at its 
facilities, the Elks Lodge cl ear ly offers irr. "accommo-
dat i ons, advantages, facilities, privileges, 
10
 Analysis of the common meaning of the word 
"business" and its usage in Utah law indicates that a 
reliance upon a profit/non-profit distinction to define the 
term is misplaced. Webster's Dictionary defines "business" 
as "activity concerned with the supplying and distribution 
of commodities." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1977 
Edition. In Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-3(10) (1953 as amended), 
a business entity is defined as "a sole proprietorship, 
partnership, association, joint venture, corporation, firm, 
trust, foundation, or other organization or entity used in 
carrying on a business." See, substantially identical 
definitions in Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-5(2), § 59-14B-l(8), § 
10-3-1303(3), and § 17-16a-3(3) (1953 as amended). Before 
revision, the Utah Rules of Evidence defined business to 
include "every kind of business, profession, occupation, 
calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for 
profit or not." Utah Rules of Evid. Rule 62(6) (since 
repealed and replaced). No reference to any profit motive 
is expressed in these notions of business. 
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services," to the public. These activities are distinctly 
open and commercial. 
That the revenue which comes from liquor sales and the 
provision of these services is funnelled back into the 
organization or are used for charitable purposes or that the 
goods may be available only to members and their guests is 
irrelevant to the invidious discrimination visited upon 
women. In the case of the Elks Lodge, the unjust 
discrimination is compounded because it occurs with the 
tacit assistance of the state which has chosen to license 
the Elks Lodge as a business entitled to sell beer and 
liquor. Thus, contrary to the finding by the court below, 
Oregon case law bolsters Ms. Beynon's contention that non-
profit, selective membership organizations which are semi-
private are "places of business." 
3. Faithful to the intent and purpose of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act, "places of business1' must be interpreted as 
broadly as is reasonably possible. 
All evidence suggests that the legislature intended the 
term "places of business" to be interpreted broadly. The 
Utah Civil Rights Act itself calls for, and legislative 
testimony mandates a liberal application of its anti-
discrimination directive. Finally, if possible, "places of 
business which sell beer" must be interpreted in a manner 
that avoids rendering the phrase superfluous. Millett v. 
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Clark Clinic Corporationf 
Harmon v. Liquor Control Commission, 445 .yooj; 
Gross v. City of Lvnnwood. 583 P. 2d 1197 (Wash, i^b) 
("whenever possible statutes shot-M be construed so that: no 
cion is superfluous1 Under this princip "vf utory 
construction, t IIM phrase must be given meaning and a broad 
interpretation indeed. 
Before the Utah Civil Rights Act was i. .y/o uo 
outlaw u :, iscrimination and to reach enterprises 
regulated by the state, tix> ivcatn already prohibited 
discrimination business establishments", MI Code 
Ann* §§ 1 3 • ; I as amended), Accordingly, 
when the legislature exparu •• scopr of the Act to 
include "places of business which sell bee; to 
add something the Act, "Places of business that sell 
beer" must be more than a mei epetition "business 
establishments".11 Because reference to •• 
establishment iready included within coverage of the Act 
a broad spectrum of institutioi organizations, see, 
infra, the phrase "places of business must 
reach * • - an uic r rn "business establishments." 
Common sense suggests * t.h" phrase was 
11
 This argument applies equally to the 19 daed 
statutory phrase "all places of business which , . house a 
state liquor store." Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as 
amended.) 
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intended to include every entity legally entitled to sell 
beer. This understanding is particularly appropriate 
because every entity legally entitled to sell beer must have 
a government license. 
Alternatively, if the legislature meant not to expand 
the meaning of the term business establishments, but instead 
to clarify or emphasize that a particular type of business 
establishment — those that sell beer — are necessarily and 
specifically to be included in the Act, the result is the 
same. The Elks Club, simply because it sells beer, is 
subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
B. The Elks Lodge is Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act 
as a Place of Business that has a State Liquor License. 
Prior to July 1, 1985, any private club selling liquor 
in Utah clearly "housed a state liquor store" for the 
purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Thus, in 1973, when 
the Utah Legislature carefully amended the Civil Rights Act 
to cover enterprises regulated by the state, it intended 
private liquor clubs to be bound by the anti-discrimination 
statute. When the former Liquor Control Act was repealed 
effective July 1, 1985 and replaced by the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act, Title 32A, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), this legislative intent did not change. Under the 
old state liquor store system, private clubs had to lease a 
26 
small portion of their premises » *tate from which the 
state would sell alcohol. The new contrc . a* i n*.* placed this 
curious configuration with a more direct 
licensing scheme. Although ( i iwil:*.' -lubs no longer house 
state liquor stores -- but are instead simply Iioencie<i by 
th^ s canons of statutory construction indicate 
that tne Act still regular ies of private liquor 
clubs such as the Elks Lodge. 
Accord i IN-i to the basic tenets of statutory con-
struction, a problemat A IS to be interpreted to 
correspond to the overall intent and purposes ni ? iw law. 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980); 
Ward v. Richfield City, 798 i M '?'./„ ill Utah Adv.Rep 
(Sup.Ct. 1990); Bd. of Education of Granite Sch. __.. 
Lake City <».vi I'^H ID in 1033 (Utah 1983) ("Intent is 
applied to carry * ;r -an be done in n 
manner which is consistent with the language 
s t a i ii'i ii i I 3 preserve the goal of Utah legislators to 
expand the scope of the Utah il Rights Act to include 
enterprises entitled to sell liquor i Uien premises, the 
CIVI1 Rights Act must be read as still covering private 
clubs now licensed i«, i e state to sell liquor. 
With the 1985 revision of UUJ iKfiot: and private club 
was no mention or indication that the Utah 
legislature intended i i ^  inj,1 private clubs from the Utah 
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Civil Rights Act. Clearly, the purpose of the 1973 
amendment to the Civil Rights Act was to eradicate gender 
discrimination in enterprises that received privilege and 
approval from the state. To subvert this purpose by 
exempting private clubs from the reach of the civil rights 
legislation would be unfaithful to the intent and purpose of 
the Act. Importantly, the same degree of state regulation 
and imprimatur once associated with housing a state liquor 
is still involved in the state/s licensing of a private club 
to sell liquor. Jan. 9, 1985, Memorandum No. 1 from Utah 
Liquor Commission to Utah State Legislature at 12 ("[T]he 
state has really not lost any real degree of actual control 
over the outlet.") Exhibit "M" attached. Because under the 
new licensing scheme the Elks Lodge enjoys the prestige and 
advantage of a state privilege, the Elks Lodge must act in a 
manner consistent with the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
Looking to statutes contemporaneous to the amendment of 
the Utah Civil Rights Act is a proper and revealing method 
for determining legislative intent. Lambert v. Mullan, 83 
So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1955) ("a repealed statute on the same 
subject may be looked to the same as other statutes to 
ascertain the intention of the Legislature"); Strauahn v. 
Amoco Production Co., 306 So.2d 39 (Fla.Ct.App 1975). 
Certainly, a proper way to determine what the Legislature 
meant by an enterprise that "houses a state liquor store" is 
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to look the provision which defined this term at the time 
the statute was enacted. While in 1973, a private club that 
sold liquor housed a state liquor store, today, a private 
club that sells liquor is licensed by the state. 
Finally, when trying to ascertain meaning of a statute, 
courts avoid construction rendering some words of the 
statute superfluous. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 
609 P.2d 934; Harmon v. Liquor Control Commission, 445 P.2d 
4; Gross v. City of Lynnwood, 583 P.2d 1197. With the 
repeal of the old liquor laws, Title 32, the only entity 
that now literally "houses a state liquor store" is the 
state of Utah.12 If the proper meaning "houses a state 
liquor store" were ignored, exempting private clubs with 
state liquor club licenses and public liquor licensees from 
the Act, the entire provision would be made superfluous or 
so limited to be almost meaningless. Since enactment of the 
12
 Today, "state stores," as they are now referred to 
in the state liquor laws, Ut.Code Ann. § 32A-2-101 (1953 as 
amended), are state controlled and operated retail outlets 
for liquor located in store fronts. Prior to 1985 
restaurants that sold liquor to patrons also "housed state 
liquor stores" in the same manner as private clubs as 
described herein. Under current liquor laws such 
restaurants no longer literally "house state liquor stores," 
but are licensed as public liquor businesses. Ut.Code Ann. 
§§ 32A-4-102 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
Thus, under defendant's proposed re-defining of the 
phrase "house a state liquor store," a restaurant today 
selling liquor to patrons is not an enterprise regulated by 
the state for application of the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
The term "state liquor store" is not found in the 
current Alcohol Beverage Control Act. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, or at least since Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a statute that preferred men 
over women as administrators of estates), a state has been 
prohibited from engaging in gender discrimination. Thus, to 
preserve the meaning and purpose of § 13-7-2(3)(b), this 
Court must find that private clubs licensed to sell liquor 
are still enterprises regulated by the state for the purpose 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
II. The Elks Lodge is a Business Establishment for the 
Purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
In addition to prohibiting discrimination by 
enterprises regulated by the state, the Utah Civil Rights 
Act forbids discrimination in "all business establishments". 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1, -3 and -4 (1953 as amended). With 
no laundry list of examples to limit the meaning of the term 
"business establishments" and with absolute descriptions 
such as "all" and "without", the text of the Act conveys 
strong purposes. By itself, the wide-reaching term 
"business establishment" prohibits the Elks Lodge's 
discriminatory conduct. Id. 
In an obvious move to reach a wide-range of discrim-
inatory conduct, the Utah legislature went beyond most state 
civil rights laws to prohibit discrimination in all business 
establishments as well as in places of public accommodation. 
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The majority of state civil rights statutes enacted in most 
states in the 1960's were patterned after federal civil 
rights legislation which prohibited discrimination only in 
"places of public accommodation." Rather than using that 
mold, Utah prohibited discrimination in all business 
establishments as well in places of public accommodation. 
Only Alaska and California civil rights provisions likewise 
forbid discrimination in all business establishments. 
Alaska Stat. § 18.80.300(7) (1981); Cal Civ. Code § 51 (West 
1982). Importantly, a survey of California case law 
provides persuasive insight into the meaning of "business 
establishment" for the purposes of civil rights legislation. 
To carry out the intent of the legislature and the 
expansive scope of the California Civil Rights Act, the 
Unruh Act, the California Courts have adopted the broadest 
definition of "business establishment" reasonably possible. 
Like the Utah Act, the Unruh Act mandates full and equal 
access to "all business establishments" and is not limited 
by any list of examples which might constrain application of 
the Act. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court 
determined that "business establishment" includes "all 
specified private and public groups or organizations" 
including those that are non-profit. O'Connor v. Village 
Green Owners Assn., 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983). Thus, the 
Unruh Act has been applied to a non-profit home owners 
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association, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., supra, 
the Boy Scouts of America, Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of 
Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1983), and a 
Christian periodical, Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal.Rptr. 866 
(Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1984). 
In 0'Connor, the California Supreme Court determined 
that a non-profit home owners association, responsible for 
enforcing age restrictions at a condominium complex, was a 
business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh Act. 
0'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., 662 P.2d 427. The 
Court concluded that the owners association had sufficient 
"businesslike attributes" to fall within the scope of the 
term "business establishment." Xd. Citing 0/Connor, the 
California Court of Appeals held that "businesslike 
attributes" could be both commercial and non-commercial in 
nature. Curran v. Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. at 336. 
These California rulings invite this Court to adopt a 
similarly broad interpretation of "business establishment" 
for the purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Such an 
interpretation would be faithful to the strong language and 
remedial purposes of the Utah Act. As did their counter-
parts in California, Utah lawmakers have progressively 
enlarged the reach of the Utah Civil Rights Act. They 
declined to limit the meaning of "business establishment" 
either by defining the term or by providing a list of 
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examples. Only a broad interpretation of the phrase would 
be consistent with language and purposes of the Utah Act. 
Accordingly, under an appropriate expansive definition 
of "business establishment", the Elks Lodge is subject to 
Utah's mandate against gender discrimination. As argued 
above, the Lodge exhibits many businesslike attributes and 
is more readily identifiable as a business than are the Boy 
Scouts or a condominium owners association. By offering 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods 
and services the Elks Lodge is necessarily engaging in the 
exact business like behavior that the Utah Act was intended 
to reach. See, supra. Most importantly, by obtaining a 
city business license and licenses to sell beer and alcohol, 
the Elks Lodge has defined itself as a business 
establishment.13 
III. The Compelling State Interest in Eliminating Invidious 
Discrimination Outweighs the Right of Elks Lodge Members to 
Associate Freely. 
In Roberts v. United State Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota 
13
 Defendant in 1969 filed Articles of Incorporation 
with the State of Utah. Those articles make three different 
references to the defendant as "transacting business," 
having a "place of business," and "doing business". Exhibit 
"F" attached. 
Defendant has all of the business like powers of a non-
profit corporation. Ut. Code Ann. § 16-6-22 (1953 as 
amended). Exhibit "H" attached. 
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statute that required the Jaycees to admit women against a 
First Amendment challenge• The Court held that the 
Constitution protected the freedom of association in two 
distinct senses. First, in order to "secure individual 
liberty," the Bill of Rights must protect "certain kinds of 
highly personal relationships" from unjustified governmental 
interference. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. The most obvious 
among these relationships are those that involve the family, 
such as marriage, procreation, the education of children and 
cohabitation with relatives. Bd. of Dirs of Rotary 
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 
(1987). Second, the Court upheld the right of individual to 
associate for expressive purposes. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
622. However, "[t]he right to associate for expressive 
purposes is not . . . absolute. Infringements on that 
right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve 
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of 
ideas." Id. at 623. Applying the Roberts holding to the 
present case indicates the relationship among Elks Lodge 
members is not the intimate association that warrants 
constitutional protection and admitting women members to the 
Lodge will not adversely effect the members' expressive 
purposes. 
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A. The Elks Lodge is Not Sufficiently Personal or Private 
to Warrant Constitutional Protection. 
Although freedom of intimate association may extend 
beyond family relationships, it includes relationships 
analogous to family associations that they are 
"distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a 
high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and 
maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in 
critical aspects of the relationship." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
620. Adopting the Roberts analysis, the Supreme Court 
refused to extend constitutional protection to the 
relationship among Rotary Club members. Rotary Club, supra 
481 U.S. 537. Over Rotary International7s claim of freedom 
of intimate association, the Supreme Court upheld the 
California Civil Rights Act although it required California 
Rotary Clubs to open membership to women. Id. 
To determine that the relationship among Rotary Club 
members was not sufficiently private to warrant constitu-
tional protection, the Court found several factors relevant. 
Significant was that "[t]he size of local Rotary Clubs 
ranges from fewer than 20 to more than 900," that "[t]here 
is no upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary 
Club," that "10 percent of the membership of a typical club 
moves away or drops out during a typical year," that "[t]he 
clubs are . . . instructed to keep a flow of prospects 
35 
coming to make up for attrition and gradually to enlarge the 
membership," that fl[m]any of the Rotary Club's central 
activities are carried on in the presence of strangers, and 
that "rather than carrying on their activities in an 
atmosphere of privacy, [Rotary Clubs] seek to keep their" 
activities open to the world. Rotary Club at 546-547. 
Although "membership in Rotary Clubs is not open to the 
general public," the Court noted that each club is 
encouraged to include in its ranks all fully qualified 
prospective members. Id.; See also, Curran v. Mount Diablo 
Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 
1983) (Boy Scouts not sufficiently private to be exempt from 
civil rights legislation); Llovd Lions Club, supra, 724 P.2d 
887 (Lions Club not entitled to freedom of intimate asso-
ciation) ; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21 (Jaycees not an 
intimate association). 
Consideration of "factors such as size, purpose, 
selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical 
aspects of the relationship," Rotary Club at 54 6, 
demonstrates that the Elks Club is not sufficiently private 
for the constitutional protection to overcome the Utah Civil 
Rights Act. With over 1,000 members, the Elks Club is 
larger than any local chapter of Rotary International. As 
with Rotary Clubs, there is no membership limit at the St. 
George Elks Lodge. In addition, the Lodge loses 
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approximately 10 percent of its membership annually and 
increases its membership by 15 percent• The central 
purposes of the Elks Lodge — charitable works and social 
interchange among members — are not conducted in private. 
Indeed, other than the Tuesday night meetings all Elks Lodge 
activities are essentially public and there is no indication 
that members seek privacy. Nor is the Elks Lodge selective 
in its membership.14 While the criteria for membership may 
appear selective, few, if any prospective applicants have 
been denied membership. Particularly representative of 
current Elks Lodge membership policy is that in a recent two 
and one half year period, no applications for membership 
were rejected. Most importantly, the Elks Lodge has 
relinquished any claim to being an intimate association by 
applying for and accepting state licenses to sell beer and 
liquor and by opening itself up as a business establishment, 
providing its facilities, food and drink to the public.15 
14
 Given that the membership at the Elks Lodge 
represents more than 6% of the male population of Washington 
County and more than 8% of the male population of St. 
George, any claim that their membership is selective is 
necessarily suspect. 
15
 Defendant's argument and analogy that the Elks Lodge 
is an extension of members7 homes fails because no member 
may legally sell beer or liquor in his home. 
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B. The Application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Elks 
Lodge Would Not Unconstitutionally Infringe Upon the Right 
of Its Members to Associate for Expressive Purposes. 
Any claim that the Elks Lodge is entitled to free 
association for the purposes of expression is easily 
dismissed. The United States Supreme Court summarily 
dismissed the claims of the Rotary Clubs to expressive 
association, commenting that "evidence fails to demonstrate 
that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any 
significant way the existing members/ ability to carry out 
their various purposes." Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548. 
Citing socializing and charity as the central purposes of 
their organization, Elks Lodge members concede that none of 
these activities would be diminished by the participation of 
women. Indeed, women are not excluded from any of the 
Lodge's activities other than their Tuesday night meetings. 
As with the Rotary Clubs, there is no indication that Elks 
Lodge members will be impeded in their freedom of expression 
if forced to comply with the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
The United States Supreme Court concluded its dis-
cussion of Rotary Club's associational rights, determining 
that "[e]ven if the Unruh Act does work some slight 
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive 
association, that infringement is justified because it 
serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating 
discrimination against women." Rotary Club. 481 U.S. at 549 
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(citations omitted). Because the Unruh Act, like the 
Minnesota statute challenged in Roberts, was content 
neutral, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the California 
civil rights legislation presented no undue threat to Rotary 
Club members' expressive association. Similarly, the Utah 
Civil Rights Act makes no distinctions on the basis of an 
organization's viewpoint and serves the same compelling 
interest of assuring equal rights to women. Therefore, 
application of the Utah Civil Rights Act to the Elks Lodge's 
unlawful discrimination is not constitutionally offensive. 
CONCLUSION 
For three distinct reasons, the Elks Lodge must conform 
to the anti-discrimination mandate of the Utah Civil Rights 
Act; the Elks Lodge is a "place of business which sell 
beer," "a place of business that houses a state liquor 
store" and a "business establishment." In addition, the 
Elks Lodge cannot avoid the reach of the Utah Civil Rights 
Act under claims of constitutionally protected free 
association. 
Analysis of legislative history and contemporaneous 
statutes and attention to the specific language of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act indicates that the Elks Lodge is an 
enterprise regulated by the state. By requesting and 
accepting state licenses to sell beer and liquor, the Elks 
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Lodge has subjected itself to state regulation and is within 
the ambit of the Utah Civil Rights Act. The authors of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act determined that in return for the 
privilege of beer sales and state liquor licenses, the Elks 
Lodge must forsake discriminatory conduct. A failure to 
subject non-profit, selective membership, semi-private 
organizations to Utah's civil rights legislation would 
seriously frustrate the purposes and intent of the Utah 
anti-discrimination Act. 
Regardless of its sale of beer and liquor, the Elks 
Lodge is a "business establishment" for the purposes of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act. As suggested by California civil 
rights law, proper interpretation of the term focuses upon 
the business-like attributes of an organization. In direct 
violation of the Utah Civil Rights Act, the Elks Lodge 
acting like a business, is openly denying Ms. Beynon equal 
access to its "accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, goods and services." This is the exact conduct 
that the Utah Legislators intended to prevent. 
Finally, the application of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
to the Elks Lodge survives any free association challenges. 
As a large, non-secretive and non-selective organization, 
the relationship among Elks Lodge members is not suffic-
iently private to warrant constitutional protection. 
Further, there is no evidence that admitting women as 
40 
members will adversely affect the ability of current members 
to carry out their purposes. Because the Utah Civil Rights 
Act is content neutral, any incidental infringement on Lodge 
members' expressive association is outweighed by the 
compelling state interest in combating invidious 
discrimination. 
RELIEF 
This Court should reverse the ruling and decision of 
the trial court, determine that the Utah Civil Rights Act 
applies to the defendant Elks Lodge and remand this case 
with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff/appellant granting declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the illegal gender based dis-
crimination in membership of the defendant St. George -
Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks. 
DATED this 29th day of JULY, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I, Section 1 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to 
worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CHAPTER 7 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act. 
It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or 
places of public accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state endan-
gers the health, safety, and general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; 
and that such discrimination in business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the public 
policy of this state. It is the purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and 
equal availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by business estab-
lishments and places of public accommodation and enterprises regulated by 
the state without discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, 
or national origin. The rules of common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof shall be strictly construed has no application to this act. This act shall 
be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy and purposes of the 
act and to promote justice. The remedies provided herein shall not be exclu-
sive but shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law or equity. 
13-7-2. Definitions. 
(1) The term "place of public accommodation" includes every place, estab-
lishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers its 
services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee or charge, except, 
any establishment located within a building which contains not more than 
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor Df 
such establishment as his residence; provided that any place, establishment, 
or facility that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the general 
public gratuitously shall be within the definition of this term if it receives any 
substantial governmental subsidy or support; but the term shall not apply to 
any institution, church, any apartment house, club, or place of accommodation 
which is in its nature distinctly private except to the extent that it is open to 
the public. 
(2) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, asso-
ciations, organizations, corporations, labor unions, legal representatives, 
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and other organized groups of 
persons. 
(3) "Enterprises regulated by the state" means: 
(a) all institutions subject to regulation under the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Credit Code, Title 70B [Utah Consumer Credit Code, Title 70C]; 
(b) all places of business which sell beer to consumers or house a state 
liquor store, as permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Title 
32A; 
(c) all insurers regulated by the Insurance Code, Title 31A; and 
(d) all public utilities subject to regulation under the Public Utilities 
Act, Title 54. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 2; 1973, ch. 18, 
§ 2; 1985, ch. 242, § 2; 1987, ch. 92, § 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the subsections and cor-
rected statutory references. 
Consumer Credit Code. — The reference 
in Subsection (3)(a) to the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Credit Code, Title 70B, was presum-
ably intended to refer to the Utah Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, which was Title 70B. 
That title was repealed in 1985 and replaced 
by Title 70C, the Utah Consumer Credit Code. 
io-/-3. £qual right in business establishments, places of 
public accommodation, and enterprises regu-
lated by the state. 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal and are 
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, 
goods and services in all business establishments and in all places of public 
accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the state of every kind 
whatsoever, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, 
ancestry or national origin. Nothing in this act shall be construed to deny any 
person the right to regulate the operation of a business establishment or place 
of public accommodation or an enterprise regulated by the state in a manner 
which applies uniformly to all persons without regard to race, color, sex, 
religion, ancestry, or national origin; or to deny any religious organization the 
right to regulate the operation and procedures of its establishments. 
13-7-4. Business establishment, place of public accommo-
dation, or enterprise regulated by the state deny-
ing rights deemed public nuisance — Investiga-
tion and conciliation — Action to enjoin — Civil 
action for damages —. Expenses of defending ac-
tion. 
Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise 
regulated by the state in which a violation of the rights provided in § 13-7-3 of 
this act occurs is a public nuisance. The operator of any such business estab-
lishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise regulated by the 
state shall be deemed guilty of maintaining a public nuisance and may be 
enjoined as hereinafter provided. 
(a) Upon application to the attorney general by any person denied the 
rights guaranteed by § 13-7-3, the attorney general shall investigate and 
seek to conciliate the matter. 
(b) An action to enjoin any nuisance defined in this section may be 
brought in the name of the state of Utah by the attorney general. Upon 
the trial of the cause, on finding that the material allegations of the 
complaint are true, the court shall order such nuisance to be abated, and 
enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such nuisance. When 
any injunction as herein provided has been granted it shall be binding 
upon the defendant and shall act as an injunction in personam against 
the defendant throughout the state. 
(c) Any person who is denied the rights provided for in § 13-7-3 shall 
have a civil action for damages and any other remedy available in law or 
equity against any person who denies him the rights provided for in 
§ 13-7-3 or who aids, incites or conspires to bring about such denial. 
(d) Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or 
enterprises regulated by the state charged with maintaining a public 
nuisance in violation of this act, which is determined or found not to be in 
violation of this act, may be awarded all actual and necessary expenses 
incurred in defending such action, as determined and approved by the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
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16-6-13.1. Clubs storing or permitting consumption of liquor on premises 
—Bond—Filing of articles, bylaws and house rules—Federal malt liquor 
revenue stamp—Establishment of state liquor store—Restrictions. (1) 
Every social club, recreational or athletic association, or kindred associa-
tion, incorporated under the provisions of this chapter, which now main-
tains or intends to maintain premises upon which liquor is or will be 
stored or consumed must procure and file with the Utah liquor control com-
mission and maintain thereafter a cash or corporate surety bond payable 
to the state of Utah, in the amount of $7500. The bond shall be in any 
form approved by the attorney general and shall be conditioned upon the 
faithful compliance by the nonprofit corporation, its officers, agents, and 
employees with the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor Control 
Act of 1969 as amended, and regulations of the commission adopted there-
under. No part of any cash bond so posted may be withdrawn either during 
the period the license is in effect, or while revocation proceedings are pend-
ing against the licensee, or for a period of six months thereafter. A bond 
filed by a licensee under the provisions of this section shall be forfeited if 
the license of a licensee is finally revoked. Upon final revocation, the at-
torney general shall undertake necessary procedures to collect the bond 
and pay the proceeds to the state treasurer. 
(2) Each club or association required by this chapter to file a $7500 
bond shall submit a copy of its articles, bylaws and house rules to the 
Utah liquor control commission, and each club or association shall abide 
by and conform to its articles, bylaws and house rules. A copy of the 
articles, bylaws and house rules and any amendments thereto shall be kept 
on file with the Utah liquor control commission at all times. 
(3) All social clubs, recreational, athletic or kindred associations organ-
ized pursuant to this chapter which have procured and filed a $7,500 bond 
as required by this section and which have on file with the Utah liquor 
control commission a copy of their articles, bylaws and house rules, and 
are abiding by them and the provisions of this chapter and the Utah Liquor 
Control Act of 1969 and regulations of the commission adopted thereunder, 
may hold a United States retail malt liquor revenue stamp and at the 
same time permit members to have, hold, store or possess liquor in or on 
premises described in such stamp. 
(4) The so-called "locker system" for the storage and serving of 
intoxicating liquors shall be legal in this state only when operated by a 
nonprofit corporation in compliance with the terms and provisions of this 
chapter and the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and 
the regulations of the commission adopted thereunder. 
(5) Under the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, the regulations 
adopted thereunder, and the provisions of this chapter, the Utah liquor 
control commission may establish a state store on premises of a social 
club, recreation, athletic or other kindred association. 
(6) Any social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred associa-
tion seeking to have a state liquor store located on its premises, shall have 
a valid license issued by the Utah liquor control commission, file a written 
application with the commission in the form prescribed, accompanied by 
an application fee of $25, the written consent of the local authority as 
defined in the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, satisfactory documentary 
proof that the applicant is currently licensed to and does operate a place 
where a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals 
are served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, satisfactory 
proof that the applicant is in compliance with the provisions of this chapter 
and the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, and the regulations adopted 
thereunder, and that the proposed vendor can qualify for and obtain the 
bond specified in section 32-1-37 of the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969. 
Every application shall contain a scaled floor plan of the social club, 
recreational, athletic, or other kindred association, including that part 
thereof in which applicant proposes that a state store be established and 
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shall set forth any other information as the commission may direct. If 
state store is so established, liquor or wine may not be stored or sold i 
any other place than as designated and approved by the commission. 
(7) The Utah liquor control commission may refuse to locate a state 
liquor store in any social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred 
association whose officer, director, managing agent or employee has been 
convicted of a felony or of violation of any ordinance, state or federal law 
concerning the sale, delivery or transportation of an alcoholic beverage, or 
who has forfeited bond to appear in court to answer charges of having 
committed a felony or having violalcd any such laws or ordinances, or has 
pleaded guilty to a charge of having committed a felony, or has violated 
any such law or ordinance, or who has been convicted of any crime in-
volving moral turpitude. 
(8) In those instances where a slate liquor store is established on 
premises occupied by a social club, recreational, athletic, or other kindred 
association, the following restrictions shall apply: 
(a) The state liquor store must remain locked at all times when it is 
not open for business. 
(b) The state store shall not stock or sell any liquor except in original 
unbroken containers. 
(c) No minor shall be employed by a*ny vendor to sell or dispense any 
alcoholic beverage. 
(d) No vendor, officer, director, managing agent or employee, nor 
any other person employed by or acting for or in behalf of any licensee, 
shall sell, deliver or furnish, or cause or permit to be sold, delivered or 
furnished any liquor or wine to : 
(i) Any minor; 
(ii) Any person actually, apparently or obviously drunk; 
(iii) Any known habitual drunkard ; 
(iv) Any known interdicted person. 
(e) Every lease, contract or other arrangement under which a state 
store is established in a social club, recreational, athletic or other kindred 
association shall be in writing and contain a provision to the effect that it 
is terminable at the option of the state, with or without cause, and with-
out liability of any kind to the state. 
(f) There shall be no advertising or other rerference to the sale of 
liquor, except as provided in section 32-1-36.5 (n). 
(g) No liquor or wine shall be sold or offered for sale at said stores 
during the following hours: 
(i) On any day of a general or primary election until after the time 
when the polls are closed. 
(ii) On Sunday and legal holidays after 12:00 midnight and prior 
to 12:00 noon. 
(h) No provision in this act or the Utah Liquor Control Act of 1969, 
shall be construed to prevent a social club, recreational, athletic or other 
kindred association which is licensed to and does operate a place where 
a variety of hot food is prepared and cooked and complete meals are 
served in connection with indoor dining accommodations, or a restaurant, 
from purchasing, storinsr or usinsr flavoring and cooking wines, liqueur 
and cordials for flavoring and cooking purposes, but no such wines, liqueurs 
or cordials shall be sold as a beverage. 
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32-1-3. Definitions.—As used in this act : 
"Alcoholic beverage'' means and includes "beer'' and "liquor" as they 
are defined herein. 
"Application" means a formal written request for the issuance of a 
permit or license. 
"Beer" means any beverage containing not less than one-half of one per 
centum of alcohol by weight and obtained by the alcoholic fermentation 
of an infusion or decoction of any malted grain or similar products. "Heavy 
beer" means beer containing more than 3.2 per centum of alcohol by weight. 
"Light beer" means beer containing not more than 3.2 per centum of 
alcohol by weight. Beer may or may not contain hops or other vegetable 
products. "Beer" includes ale, stout and porter. 
"Brewer" means any person engaged in manufacturing beer. 
"Commission" means "Utah liquor control commission." 
"Council" means citizens' council. 
"Dentist" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to 
practice dentistry under the laws of the state of Utah. 
"Druggist" or "pharmacist" means any person holding a valid and 
unrevoked license as a registered pharmacist under the laws of the state 
of Utah and who is actually in good faith engaged in the business of 
compounding and dispensing drugs or medicines. 
"Drugstore" or "pharmacy" shall be as defined by the statutes of Utah. 
"Interdicted person" means a person to whom the sale of liquor is pro-
hibited by an order made under this act. 
"Liquor" means and includes alcohol, or any alcoholic, spirituous, 
vinous, fermented, malt, or other liquid or combination of liquids, a part 
of which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented, and all other drinks or 
drinkable liquids, containing more than one-half of one per centum of 
alcohol by weight; and all mixtures, compounds or preparations, whether 
liquid or not, which contain more than one-half of one per centum of alcohol 
by weight, and which are capable of human consumption; except that 
the term "liquor" shall not include "light beer." 
"Local authority" means (a) the board of county commissioners of the 
county in which the premises are located if the premises are located in an 
unincorporated area of the county or (b) the governing body of the 
city or town in which the premises are located if the premises are located 
in an incorporated city or town. 
"Manufacture" means to distill, brew, rectify, blend, mix, compound, 
process, ferment, or otherwise make any alcoholic beverage as defined 
in this act. 
"Minor" means any person under the age of twenty-one years. 
"Package" shall mean any container, bottle, vessel, or other receptacle 
immediately containing liquor. 
"Package agency" means an outlet authorized by the commission to sell 
original package liquor or wine for consumption off the premises. 
"Person" includes any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, as-
sociation, or any group or combination, and the plural as well as the singu-
lar number, unless the intent to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by 
the context. 
"Physician" means a person holding a valid and unrevoked license to 
practice medicine and surgery in the state of Utah. 
"Premises" means any room, enclosure, building or structure where 
alcoholic beverages may be lawfully manufactured, stored, sold, or consumed 
as provided in this act. 
A 6 
"Prescription" means a writing in the form prescribed by the regula-
tions, signed by a physician, and given by him to a patient for the obtaining 
of liquor pursuant to this act for use for medicinal purposes only. 
"Public place" shall mean and include any place, building or convey-
ance, to which the public has, or is permitted to have access, and any 
highway, street, lane, park or place of public resort or amusement, and 
any other place which, under the provisions of this act, has been declared to 
be a public place. 
"Regulations" means regulations made by the commission. 
"Residence" means and includes any building, or part of a building, 
where a person resides, but shall not include any part of a building which 
is not actually and exclusively used as a private residence, nor any part of 
a hotel other than a private guest room, nor a club or any part thereof, 
nor any place from which there is access to a club or hotel except through 
a street or lane or other open and unobstructed means of access, nor any 
portion of a building used in part for business purposes unless such portion 
is separated from the part used for business purposes by a wall or walls 
having no doors or other means of access opening into such part used 
for business purposes. 
"Restaurant" means a place of business whore a variety of Lot food 
is prepared and cooked and complete meals are served to the general 
public in connection with indoor dining accommodations. 
"Retailer" means any person engaged in the sale or distribution of 
alcoholic beverages 1o the consumer. 
"Sell" or "to sell" when used in this act in any prohibition, shall be con-
strued to include: to solicit or receive an order for; to keep or expose for 
sale; to deliver for value; to peddle; to possess with intent to sell; 1o 
traffic in; for any consideration, promised or obtained, directly or indirectly, 
or under any pretext or by any means whatsoever, to procure or allow 
to be procured for any other person; and "sale." when so used, shall 
include every act of selling as above defined. 
"State store" shall mean an outlet for the sale of liquor located on 
premises owned or leased by the state of Utah. 
"Wholesaler" means any person other than a manufacturer, en erased 
in the importation for sale, or in the sale of alcoholic beverages in whole-
sale or jobbincr quantities to the commission or to retailers. 
"Wine" includes any alcoholic beverage obtained by the fermentation 
of the natural sugar content of fruits, plants, honey or milk, whether or 
not other ingredients are added. 
(repealed) 
32-1-36. State stores.—Unless otherwise prohibited, stores to be known 
as state liquor stores may be established by the commission at such places 
in the state as considered advisable for the sale of liquor in accordance 
with the provisions of this act and the regulations made thereunder. 
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32A-1-5. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(41) "State store" means a facility for the sale of package liquor 
located on premises owned or leased by the state of Utah and operated 
by state employees. This term shall not apply to restaurants, private 
clubs, or package agencies. 
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Cooperating Attorneys for 
UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES 
FOUNDATION, INC. 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, personally and 
on behalf of a class of 
women similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743 
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER 
OF ELKS, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 90 - ^ ^ 
COMPLAINT 
(Hon. J. Philip Eves) 
THE PLAINTIFF, SANDRA BEYNON, personally and on behalf 
of a plaintiff class, by and through counsel BRIAN M. 
BARNARD as a complaint and cause of action against the ST. 
GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743 of the BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OF ELKS states as follows: 
*:K -^ ' 
PARTIES 
1. SANDRA BEYNON, the named plaintiff is a female 
adult citizen and resident of the City of St. George, 
Washington County and the State of Utah. 
2. ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE // 1743, BENEVOLENT & PROTEC-
TIVE ORDER OF ELKS is a Utah non-profit corporation, affili-
ated with the national fraternal organization known as the 
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS. The ST. GEORGE-DIXIE 
LODGE operates facilities located at 1225 No. 600 West, St. 
George, Washington County, Utah, 
3. The BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS is a 
nationwide American fraternity which as been in existence 
for more than one hundred and twenty (120+) years. It 
maintains and sanctions lodges or local chapters throughout 
the United States of America, with approximately fourteen 
(14) such lodges in Utah including the named defendant. 
Women are not permitted to be members of the BENEVOLENT & 
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS and the defendant. Section 14.010 
of the Grand Lodge Statutes of the Benevolent & Protective 
Order of Elks of the United States of America (the rules of 
the nation organization which govern the defendant herein as 
to membership) requires that an applicant for membership in 
the national organization or a local Elks lodge must be a 
male citizen of the United States of America. 
2 
JURISDICTION and VENUE 
4. This action is commenced pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 13-7-4(c) (1953 as amended). Jurisdiction is proper in 
this Court pursuant to Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 as 
amended) and Art. VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
Injunctive relief is provided for by Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-4 
(1953 as amended), Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4. Venue is proper 
in this court pursuant to the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
78-13-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
5. The Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Department has 
issued to the defendant lodge a license to operate a private 
liquor club under the provisions of §§ 32A-5-1 et seq., Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended). Pursuant to Utah statutes and 
the policies of the defendant, members of the defendant and 
their guests may purchase liquor through the defendant's 
private liquor club facilities. 
6. The named defendant, pursuant to the Utah Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Department, issuance of licenses to operate 
as a private liquor club, does "house a state liquor store" 
under the provisions of Ut. Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1, § 32-1-3 
and § 32-1-36 (1953 as amended)(all repealed effective July 
1, 1986) and as contemplated in the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as amended). 
7. Defendant lodge, pursuant to the Utah Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Department issuance of licenses to operate 
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as private liquor clubs, sells beer to persons who consume 
beer under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-5-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended) and as contemplated in the Utah Civil 
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3) (b) (1953 as amended). 
8. Defendant lodge, pursuant to the Utah Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Department authority, has been issued a 
license, by the city, the town and/or the county in which it 
is located, to sell beer to persons who consume beer under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-5-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended) and as contemplated in the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
Ut. Code Ann. § 13-7-2(3)(b) (1953 as amended). 
9. Defendant lodge operates a lodge facility in which 
food and non-alcoholic beverages are served to consumers, 
receptions are held, meetings and parties catered, etc. 
These facilities are open to and may be used by the members 
of the defendant lodge, their families and their guests. 
10. Defendant lodge is a "business establishment" as 
governed by the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. § 
13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
11. Defendant lodge is a "enterprise regulated by the 
state" pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Civil Rights 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
12. On or about June 11, 1987 plaintiffs1 counsel 
corresponded with the defendant through Utah State Special 
Deputy Grand Exalted Ruler of the GRAND LODGE OF THE 
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BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, United States of 
America, Elton J. Thompson and Art Summers regarding the 
defendant's policy of not allowing women to be members of 
the Elks. A true and correct copy of that letter from 
plaintiffs1 counsel to Art Summers is attached, marked 
Exhibit T 1 , and incorporated herein by reference. 
13. On or about July 31, 1987 the Utah State Special 
Deputy Grand Exalted Ruler of the GRAND LODGE OF THE BENEVO-
LENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, United States of America, 
Elton J. Thompson, replied to plaintiffs' counsel regarding 
that policy. A true and correct copy of that letter to 
plaintiffs' counsel from Mr. Thompson is attached, marked 
Exhibit f,R"f and incorporated herein by reference. 
14. That reply (Exhibit "R") essentially stated that 
the defendant and their national officers believe they are 
"conducting their activities on conformance with the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States and the law of Utah" 
and that they would continue to refuse to allow women to be 
members of the Elks and the defendant. 
15. On or about August 7, 1987 the named plaintiff 
SANDRA BEYNON applied for membership in the ST. GEORGE DIXIE 
LODGE #1743, of the BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, 
defendant herein. A true and correct copy of her applica-
tion is attached, marked Exhibit "A-l" and f,A-2fl, and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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16. About September 29, 1987 the ST. GEORGE-DIXIE 
LODGE #1743, benevolent and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS reject-
ed the named plaintiff SANDRA BEYNON'S application for 
membership in that lodge. A true and correct copy of that 
rejection letter is attached, marked Exhibit "N", and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
17. (a) A reason for the rejection of the membership 
application of BEYNON is the named plaintiff's gender. (b) 
The only reason for the rejection of the named plaintiff's 
membership application is her gender, (c) The named 
plaintiff meets all criteria for membership except for 
gender. (d) The two (2) Elks Club members listed as 
references in paragraphs 14 and 16 of the plaintiff's 
application (Exhibit "A-l") declined to serve as references 
for the plaintiff's application solely because of the 
plaintiff's gender, (e) Even if the plaintiff SANDRA BEYNON 
and her proposer had submitted with plaintiff's application 
(Exhibit "A") the required Application Fee, the defendant 
St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, would have rejected that 
application solely on the basis of plaintiff's gender. 
18. Plaintiff has been informed and therefore believes 
that all Elks lodges in Utah refuse to admit women as 
members. That refusal is based upon Section 14.010 of the 
Grand Lodge Statutes of the Benevolent and Protective Order 
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of Elks of the United States of America which requires that 
an applicant for membership shall be male. 
19. Upon information and belief, because the above 
cited rule of the national organization of the Elks prohib-
its women from being members, if a local Utah lodge (such as 
defendant) admitted a woman that lodge would probably be 
expelled from the national organization, therefore no woman 
could be allowed to be a member of any local Elks lodge in 
Utah. 
CLASS DEFINITION 
20. The named plaintiff desires to represent a class 
of female persons similarly situated in pursuit of this 
action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
21. The plaintiff class is defined as follows: 
(a) All adult female residents, citizens and 
domiciliaries of Washington County and the State of Utah; 
(b) who, in the past desired, now desire or in the 
future will desire to be a member of the named defendant 
organization; 
(c) who qualify for membership in the defendant 
organization in all respects except gender; and, 
(d) who have been or will be rejected by the defendant 
for membership on the basis of gender. 
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22. This class is appropriate under Rule 23 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
NAMED PLAINTIFF BEYNON 
23. The conduct of the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE 
LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS toward 
the named plaintiff BEYNON, as set forth above, constitutes 
a violation of the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. 
§13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). The plaintiff BEYNON is 
entitled to declaratory relief to that affect. 
24. The conduct of the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE 
LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS toward 
the named plaintiff BEYNON in violation of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amend-
ed), as set forth above, has caused great harm, affront, 
suffering and damage to the plaintiff BEYNON. 
25. The named plaintiff BEYNON has been informed and 
believes that unless ordered to comply with the provisions 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended) the defendant will continue to 
violate that statute. The named plaintiff BEYNON, there-
fore, requests that a preliminary injunction and a permanent 
injunction be issued against the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE 
LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS 
8 
ordering it to immediately comply with the provisions of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 
as amended)t and to cease all gender-based discrimination 
against her. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
PLAINTIFF CLASS 
26. The conduct of the defendant in refusing to permit 
women to be members of their BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER 
OF ELKS lodges constitutes a violation of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amend-
ed) . The plaintiff class is entitled to declaratory relief 
to that affect. 
27. The named plaintiff has been informed and believes 
that unless ordered to comply with the provisions of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 
as amended) , the defendant will continue to violate those 
statutes as against all of the plaintiff class, therefore 
requests a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction 
be issued against defendant lodge of the BENEVOLENT and 
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS, ordering it*to comply with the 
provisions of tha Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended), and not to discriminate 
with regard to membership on the basis of gender as against 
members of the plaintiff class. 
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RELIEF 
NAMED PLAINTIFF 
WHEREFORE, the named plaintiff, SANDRA BEYNON demands 
the following relief: 
1. Declaratory relief that the conduct of the defen-
dant ST, GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743, BENEVOLENT and PROTEC 
TECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS toward the named plaintiff constitutes 
a violation of the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 
13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
2. A preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction 
be issued against the defendant ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE 
1743 of the BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS ordering 
it to immediately comply with the provisions of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended), and to cease all gender-based discrimination 
against the named plaintiff, BEYNON. 
3. For the costs of this action and such other and 
further relief as the Court deems ;ust and proper in the 
premises. 
PLAINTIFF CLASS 
4. For an order allowing this matter to proceed as a 
plaintiff class action under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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5. For declaratory relief determining that the conduct 
of the defendant in 'refusing to allow plaintiff class 
members to be members of its lodge of the Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks Lodges, constitutes a violation of 
the Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut, Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. 
(1953 as amended)• 
6. For a preliminary injunction and a permanent 
injunction issued against the defendant lodge ordering it to 
immediately comply with the provisions of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 et seq. (1953 as amend-
ed) , and not to discriminate with regard to membership on 
the basis of gender against members of the plaintiff class. 
7. For the costs of this action and such other and 
further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
DATED this 9th day of APRIL, 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
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^JlilU JUL'giil KAIU1C 
^14 Hast Vifth South 
W / Ltke City, Utah H4IU 
(SOI) UKW.il .««-««12 
/;,:.,- M ru»:.:J Jwne 111 1987 
Art Summers 
Utah State Director 
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OF ELKS 
632 N. Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
RE: MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTIONS 
ELKS LODGES in UTAH 
Dear Mr. Summers: 
I represent two (2) women who have approached me about 
instituting legal action against the St. George-Dixie Elks 
Lodge, 111 US. and the Elks Lodge #85
 f in Salt Lake County. 
My clients wish to become Elks in order to partake of the 
social and community service nature of the organization. and 
to participate in the "private club11 aspects of the local 
lodges. Roth were dismayed to discover membership is 
limited to men. 
The Utah Civil Rights Act, Ut. Code Ann. $§13-7-1 ct 
scq 11953 as amended) prohibits gender discrimination in 
"business establishments19 and by Mall enterprises regulated 
by the state.11 Under the Civil Rights Act each Elks Lodge 
in Utah is a "business establishment" and, if it sells beer 
or operates as a private liquor club, qualifies as an 
"enterprise regulated by the state.1* 
To enforce the provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
1 intend to commence a state wide class action lawsuit 
against every Elks Lodge in Utah (which has a private club 
liquor license) on behalf of each woman interested in 
becoming an Elk. Given the recent United States Supreme 
Court decision regarding the Duarte Rotary Club in 
California and a similar case now pending before the Utah 
Supreme Court against the ALTA CLUB in Salt Lake City, the 
legal precedent is in my clients1 favor. 
My clients want to avoid litigation. If, within two 
(2) weeks,1 steps can be taken toward ending the Utah Elks* 
unlawful gender discrimination, litigation can be avoided. 
Please let me know what your position is. 
pdq/BMB 
cc: Clients 
D.C. Bulloch, St 
Clyde S. Pierce, 
David Wilkinson, 
SJACereJ^yourXy7 
/lJRIAN \f. \BAJHfARD 
Attorney at Law. 
George, Utah • 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney General 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
HICKSVIUE. NEW YORK 11802 
2750 take V *w Av< 
CHICAGO. ILLINOIS 
G B I A N H I, O 1> G B 
O II » B II O F K L K S 
ALTON J. THOMPSON 
Special Deputy Grand Exalted Ruler 
33 South Uth East Street 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103 
July 31, 1987 
Mr* Brian Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic 
2Ui East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 81*111 
Dear Sir: 
As I previously advised you, I would reply back to you 
concerning your letter of Juno 11, 1907, and subsequent 
communication of July 21* 
1 wish to advise you that it is the position of the SUc 
lodges concornod, supported by nil lodges in Utah, that they 
are conducting their activities in conformance with the Cons-
titution and laws of the United States and the laws of Utah* 
Tho Benevolent and Protective Order of Elk3 is an American 
fraternity in existence for more than U 9 years and desixes to 
remain as a fraternal organization* 
It is further the position of our ladies that they wish to 
riaintain their own private organization without male members* 
lk>th groups claim this right to determine what their membership 
qualifications and procedures should be* 
Respectfully, 
Alton J, Thompson, SDGER 
«•£?! 1^1*/"*!* n n / i T f i n f 1 f f / i ^ »* « ' A 
CCS 
Hon. Francis M# Smith, PGER 
Hon. Robert A# Yothers, PGER 
Hon. Gerald Strohm, PGER 
Hon. David Wilkinson 
Utah Elks Association 
Utah Ladies Of Elks Association 
All Utah Elk Lodges 
D O E S Drove #27 
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks 
Brother Lang »Foremaster 
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Benevolent end Protective order of Elks 
P.O. Box 1450 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH • 84770 
Phone (801J 873-1743 
September 29f 1987 
P. Lang Foremaster 
165 North 100 East 
St, Georget Utah 84770 
Dear Brother Foremaster: 
Persuant to Section 14,010 Grand Lodge Statutes of the 
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States 
of America an applicant for membership shall be: 
(a) A Male citizen of the United States of America, 
(b) Line 14 of the application for membership the two 
references have declined in writing to be a reference 
on the subject application. Also on item 16 the same 
applies. 
According to Article X, Section 1 of the By Laws and Rules of 
Order of St. George "Dixie" Utah Lodge 01743, the proper appli-
cation fee was not submitted. 
In accordance with the above information we are hereby returning 
the application which you submitted. 
Sincerely and fraternallyt 
W, W. Cannon, Jr.^Secretary 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, 
v s . 
Pla in t i f f , 
ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE #174 3 
BENEVOLENT & PROTECTIVE ORDER 
OF ELKS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No, 900503229 
This matter came before the Court on October 30, 1991, 
for hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The plaintiff was 
present and represented by Brian M. Barnard, her attorney. The 
defendant was represented by Glenn C. Hanni, its attorney. The 
Court heard oral argument and took the matter under submission. 
Being now fully advised in the premises the Court enters the 
following decision and order. 
By her complaint in this matter plaintiff seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief for the reason that she has 
been denied membership in the defendant Elks Lodge (hereinafter 
"Lodge"). Plaintiff alleges that the denial violates the Utah 
Civil Rights Act, U.C.A. 13-7-1 et sea. The facts are not in 
dispute insofar as they are material to a determination of the 
i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e - The p a r t i e s so s t i p u l a t e d a t t h e O c t o b e r 
30, 1991 h e a r i n g . 
FACTS 
1. On or about August 7, 1987, plaintiff, a female, 
applied for membership in the Lodge. 
2. On or about September 29, 1987, the Lodge rejected 
plaintiff's application solely on the basis that plaintiff is 
female. 
3. Lodge is an organization' which has selective 
criteria for its membership and is not open to the general 
public. 
4. Membership in the Lodge requires that one: 
a. Be a male American citizen 
b. Be 21 years of age or older 
c. Have a belief in God 
d. Have never committed a crime 
e. Be a non-communist 
f. Be sponsored by at least two members 
of the Lodge 
g. Be willing to uphold the Constitution 
and laws of the United States of 
America 
h. Be willing to pledge allegiance to 
the United States and salute the flag 
i. Be of good character 
j . Promote fellowship amongst members 
of the defendant organization. 
5. Lodge is a private, fraternal club not open to 
the general public. 
6. Lodge sells beer pursuant to a proper license. 
7. Lodge is a licensee or permittee of the State of 
Utah for purposes of selling liquor on its premises. 
8. Lodge does not sell beer or liquor to the general 
public, nor does it offer its other services and activities to 
the general public, but only to its members and their guests. 
9. Lodge is a non-profit organization under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
10. Lodge does not engage in business for profit. 
ANALYSIS 
The cross Motions for Summary Judgment turn on the 
question of whether the Utah Civil Rights Act applies to Lodge. 
The parties agree that if the Act applies to Lodge, then 
plaintiff is entitled to relief. Likewise, if the Act does not 
apply to Lodge, plaintiff's Complaint must fail. The case 
presents the rather narrow question: Is Lodge an "Enterprise 
regulated by the state" within the meaning of U.C.A. 13-7-2 (3) 
(b)? Neither party has presented any authority indicating that 
this issue has been addressed by any appellate court. 
Section 13-7-1 U.C.A. makes the Utah Civil Rights Act 
applicable to all enterprises regulated by the state and would 
prohibit gender discrimination by those enterprises. 
"Enterprises regulated by the state" means: 
11
 {b} all places of business which sell beer to 
consumers or house a state liquor store, as 
permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Act, Title 32A; " [ U.C.A. 13-7-2 (3)(b)] 
The parties agree that Lodge sells beer to consumers 
and disagree whether Lodge houses a state liquor store. Since 
the statute speaks in the disjunctive, it is of no import whether 
Ledge houses a state liquor store. It is enough that it sells 
beer. 
The real question is whether Lodge is a "place of 
business" within the meaning of the statute. The term business 
is especially difficult to define. The term itself has no 
definite or legal meaning. (Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, 
p. 248) . It is obviously a broad term capable of different 
meanings in different contexts. The legislature did not define 
the word or the phrase when it was placed in the statute. No 
Utah Court decision supplies the definition. It is left to this 
Court to state the definition as a matter of first impression. 
In determining the meaning of "place of business", the 
Court is influenced by rulings of other Courts. In Schwenk v. 
B.S.A. , 551 P. 2d, 465 (Oregon, 1976) the Oregon Supreme Court 
ruled that the Boy Scouts of America was not a business subject 
to Oregon's civil rights act because it was not a commercial 
enterprise which offers goods or services to the public. 
efendants have cited several cases from other jurisdictions, State 
nd Federal, which seem to apply a similar definition for purposes of 
ivil rights acts. 
This Court is persuaded that the legislature intended to 
irohibit gender discrimination in all places where commercial 
LCtivities for purposes of making monetary profit and offered to the 
feneral public are being conducted. The Lodge is a non-profit 
>rganization, does not operate to create monetary profits, and is not 
>pen to the general public. 
Accordingly, the Court Denies plaintiff's Motion and 
Grants defendant's Motion. Summary Judgment is Granted to defendant. 
Plaintiff's Complaint is Ordered Dismissed. 
Dated this *r{dL day of November, 1991. 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on this day of 
November, 1991, I mailed true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Memorandum Decision to the following: 
Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
Utal Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
600 Boston .Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Onfirfivh. Jl/7ii^ 
Glenn C. Hanni, A1327 
G. Eric Nielson, 5327 
STRONG £ HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sixth Floor 3oston Building 
Salt Lake Ciry, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE FIFTE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0£ WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1 7 4 3 , 
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE 
ORDER OF ELKS, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
Plainriff's motion for summary judgment and defendant's 
motion for summary judgment came on for hearing before the court 
on Ocroher 20, 1991. Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, 
Brian M. 3arnard. Defendant was represented by its at-iom^y, 
Glenn C. Hanni of ~he firm of Strong £ Eanni.. Depositions of 
various witnesses were filed with the cler): and were ordered 
opened and published. The court having considered -he records, 
files, depositionsr briefs, and having heard arguments of counsel, 
and having made and entered its Memorandum Decision on the 4th 
day of November, IS91, and being fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil NO. r;gS-?I81> 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
1. For the reasons stated in the court's Memorandum 
Decision dated November 4, 1991, the motion of plaintiff for 
summary judgment is hereby deniedP and the motion of defendant 
for summary judgment is hereby granted. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant 
St, George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks and against the plaintiff Sandra Bevnon, no cause of action. 
3. Defendant is hereby awarded its costs*i^ ^ ^ amounfe 
of $ 
Dated thi s £> — day of •Movombcr, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
PhiTip Ev^, Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of October, 1991, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, 
first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Brian M. Barnard 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
<US«3SM LL ( P J^'rtOCC' 
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UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS & 
LIBERTIES FOUNDATION, INC. 
by COOPERATING ATTORNEYS 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
JOHN PACE USB #5624 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UTAH 84111 - 3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, personally and s 
on behalf of a class of female 
persons similarly situated, ; 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
ST. GEORGE-DIXIE LODGE # 1743, 
BENEVOLENT and PROTECTIVE ORDER 
OF ELKS, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 
: 90-050-3229 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
(Hon. J. Phillip 
: Eves) 
THE NAMED PLAINTIFF, SANDRA BEYNON, by and through 
counsel, hereby gives notice of her appeal of the Memorandum 
Decision dated November 4, 1991 herein (copy attached as 
Exhibit "D") and the Order Granting Summary Judgment herein 
(copy attached as Exhibit "S") denying plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
Plaintiff also appeals the order and decision (copy 
attached as Exhibit "C") of the Court denying plaintiff's 
motion to certify that above matter as a plaintiff class 
action under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
This appeal is to the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this 5th day of DECEMBER, 1991. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
2 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1991, 
I caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
JAN GRAHAM 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
counsel for an interested party, and to: 
GLEN C. HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor 
BOSTON BUILDING 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
1ARD, 
for Plaintiffs 
bmb\beynappe.not\elks 
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13-7-1 COMMERCE AND TRADE 
13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act 
It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or 
places of public accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state endan-
gers the health, safety, and general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; 
and that such discrimination in business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the public 
policy of this state. It is the purpose of this act to assure all citizens full and 
equal availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by business estab-
lishments and places of public accommodation and enterprises regulated by 
the state without discrimination because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, 
or national origin. The rules of common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof shall be strictly construed has no application to this act. This act shall 
be liberally construed with a view to promote the policy and purposes of the 
act and to promote justice. The remedies provided herein shall not be exclu-
sive but shall be in addition to any other remedies available at law or equity. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, s i; 1973, ch. 18, Cross-References. — Utah Anti-Discrimi-
§ 1. nation Act, §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
act" refers to Laws 1965, ch. 174, which 
enacted this section and §§ 13-7-2 to 13-7-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note: State Legisla-
tive Response to the Federal Civil Rights Act 
A Proposal, 9 Utah L. Rev. 434. 
Am. Jur. 2d. —15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights 
§ 16 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 14 CJ.S. Civil Rights §§ 6-11, 
14-21. 
A.L.R. — Actionability under state statutes 
of discrimination because of complaining 
party's association with persons of different 
race, color, or the like, 35 A.LJl.3d 859. 
Discrimination on basis of illegitimacy as de-
nial of constitutional rights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613. 
Constitutionality of enactment or regulation 
forbidding or restricting employment of aliens 
in public employment or on public works, 38 
A.L.R.3d 1213. 
Recovery of damages for emotional distress 
resulting from racial, ethnic, or religious abuse 
or discrimination, 40 A.L.R.3d 1290. 
Construction and operation of "equal oppor-
tunity clause" requiring pledge against racial 
discrimination in hiring under construction 
contract, 44 AJLR.3d 1283. 
Racial or religious discrimination in furnish-
ing of public utilities, services, or facilities, 53 
A.L.R.3d 1027. 
Validity in application of provisions govern-
ing determination of residency for purpose of 
fixing fee differential for out-of-state students 
in public college, 56 A.LJUd 641. 
Recovery of damages for emotional distress 
resulting from discrimination because of sex or 
marital status, 61 A.LJL3d 944. 
Trailer park as place of public accommoda-
tion within meaning of state civil rights stat-
utes, 70 A.L.R.3d 1142. 
Recovery of damages as remedy for wrongful 
discrimination under state or local civil rights 
provisions, 85 A.LJL3d 351. 
State law prohibiting sex discrimination as 
violated by dress or grooming requirements for 
customers of establishments serving food or 
beverages, 89 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Prohibition, under state civil rights laws, of 
racial discrimination in rental of privately 
owned residential property, 96 AJLR.3d 497. 
Identification of job seeker by race, religion, 
national origin, sex, or age, in "situation 
wanted" employment advertising as violation 
of state civil rights laws, 99 A.L.R.3d 154. 
On-the-job sexual harassment as violation of 
state civil rights law, 18 A.L.R.4th 328. 
What constitutes illegal discrimination un-
der state statutory prohibition against discrim-
ination in housing accommodations on account 
of marital status, 33 A.LR.4th 964. 
Race as factor in adoption proceedings, 34 
A.L.R.4th 167. 
Exclusion or expulsion from association or 
club as violation of state civil rights act, 38 
AJLJUth 628. 
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13-7-2. Definitions. 
(1) The term "place of public accommodation** includes every place, estab-
lishment, or facility of whatever kind, nature, or class that caters or offers its 
services, facilities, or goods to the general public for a fee or charge, except, 
any establishment located within a building which contains not more than 
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of 
such establishment as his residence; provided that any place, establishment, 
or facility that caters or offers its services, facilities, or goods to the general 
public gratuitously shall be within the definition of this term if it receives any 
substantial governmental subsidy or support; but the term shall not apply to 
any institution, church, any apartment house, club, or place of accommodation 
which is in its nature distinctly private except to the extent that it is open to 
the public. 
(2) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, partnerships, asso-
ciations, organizations, corporations, labor unions, legal representatives, 
trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and other organized groups of 
persons. 
(3) "Enterprises regulated by the state" means: 
(a) all institutions subject to regulation under the Utah Uniform Com-
mercial Credit Code, Title 70B [Utah Consumer Credit Code, Title 70C]; 
(b) all places of business which sell beer to .consumers or house a state 
liquor store, as permitted by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Title 
32A; 
(c) all insurers regulated by the Insurance Code, Title 31A; and 
(d) all public utilities subject to regulation under the Public Utilities 
Act, Title 54. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, $ 2; 1973, ch. 18, in Subsection (3)(a) to the Utah Uniform Com* 
§ 2; 1985, ch. 242, $ 2; 1987, ch. 92, § 23. mercial Credit Code, Title 70B, was presum* 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- ably intended to refer to the Utah Uniform 
ment redesignated the subsections and cor- Consumer Credit Code, which was Title 70B. 
rected statutory references. That title was repealed in 1985 and replaced 
Consumer Credit Code. — The reference by Title 70C, the Utah Consumer Credit Code. 
13-7-3. Equal right in business establishments, places of 
public accommodation, and enterprises regu-
lated by the state. 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal and are 
entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, 
goods and services in all business establishments and in all places of public 
accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the state of every kind 
whatsoever, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, 
ancestry or national origin. Nothing in this act shall be construed to deny any 
person the right to regulate the operation of a business establishment or place 
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13-7-4 COMMERCE AND TRADE 
of public accommodation cr an enterprise regulated by the state in a manner 
which applies uniformly to all persons without regard to race, color, sex, 
religion, ancestry, or national origin; or to deny any religious organization the 
right to regulate the operation and procedures of its establishments. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 3; 1973, ch. 18, 
S 3 . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Massage regulation. ceptions, did not violate this section. Redwood 
County ordinance prohibiting massages by Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 
members of the opposite sex, with certain ex- 1138 (Utah 1981). 
13-7-4. Business establishment, place of public accommo-
dation, or enterprise regulated by the state deny-
ing rights deemed public nuisance — Investiga-
tion and conciliation — Action to enjoin — Civil 
action for damages — Expenses of defending ac-
tion. 
Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise 
regulated by the state in which a violation of the rights provided in § 13-7-3 of 
this act occurs is a public nuisance. The operator of any such business estab-
lishment or place of public accommodation or enterprise regulated by the 
state shall be deemed guilty of maintaining a public nuisance and may be 
enjoined as hereinafter provided. 
(a) Upon application to the attorney general by any person denied the 
rights guaranteed by § 13-7-3, the attorney general shall investigate and 
seek to conciliate the matter. 
(b) An action to enjoin any nuisance defined in this section may be 
brought in the name of the state of Utah by the attorney general. Upon 
the trial of the cause, on finding that the material allegations of the 
complaint are true, the court shall order such nuisance to be abated, and 
enjoin all persons from maintaining or permitting such nuisance. When 
any injunction as herein provided has been granted it shall be binding 
upon the defendant and shall act as an injunction in personam against 
the defendant throughout the state. 
(c) Any person who is denied the rights provided for in § 13-7-3 shall 
have a civil action for damages and any other remedy available in law or 
equity against any person who denies him the rights provided for in 
§ 13-7-3 or who aids, incites or conspires to bring about such denial. 
(d) Any business establishment or place of public accommodation or 
enterprises regulated by the state charged with maintaining a public 
nuisance in violation of this act, which is determined or found not to be in 
violation of this act, may be awarded all actual and necessary expenses 
incurred in defending such action, as determined and approved by the 
court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 174, § 4; 1973, ch. 18, act" refers to Laws 1965, ch. 174, which 
§ 4. enacted this section and §§ 13-7-1 to 13-7-3. 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this 
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KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That we, the undersigned, have this^fr^ day of October, 1969, 
voluntarily-associated ourselves together for the purpose of form-) 
ing a non-profit corporation under the laws of the State of Utah, 
and we hereby certify: 
PIRST: That the name of said non-profit corporation shall bej 
"St. George fDixie1 Lodge No, 1743, Benevolent and Protective 
Order of Elks of the United States of America." 
SECOND: That the purposes for which said Corporation is 
formed are: 
(a) The primary purpose for which this Corporation is 
formed is to inculcate the principles of charity, justice, brother)-
ly love and fidelity; to promote the welfare and enhance the 
happiness of its' members; to quicken the spirit of American 
patriotism; to cultivate good fellowship and to perpetuate itself 
as a fraternal organization. 
(b) Other purposes for which this Corporation is 
formed are: To do all the acts and things, and business and 
businesses in any manner connected with the objects or purposes oij 
powers of the Corporation, or necessary, incidental, convenient oij 
auxiliary thereto, to calculate directly or indirectly to promote 
the interests, objectives and ideals of the organization,* and in 
addition, to have and exercise all rights, powers, and privileges 
now or hereafter belonging to or conferred upon non-profit 
corporations existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
i 
(c) The foregoing statement of purpose or purposes 
shall be construed as a statement of both purpose and powers and 
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the purposes and powers in each clause shall, except where other-
wise expressed, be in nowise limited or restricted by reference tol 
or inference from the terms or provisions of any other clause, but] 
shall be regarded as independent purposes and powers. 
THIRD: This Corporation is organized exclusively as a 
fraternal organization, as a non-profit corporation, and its 
activities shall be conducted for the aforesaid purposes in such 
manner that no part of its net earnings will inure to the benefit 
of any member, director, trustee, officer or individual, 
FOURTH: That said Corporation is organized pursuant to the 
General Non-profit Corporation Law. 
FIFTH: That the principal office for the transaction of 
business of the Corporation is to be located invthe County of 
Washington, City of St. George, Utah. 
SIXTH: The officers, directors and trustees of this 
corporation, their nominations, election or appointment, installatl-
ion, power and authority shall be in accordance with the provisions 
of the By-Laws of this Corporation. 
(b) The governing body of this Corporation shall be its! 
Board of Director^, which said Board of Directors shall consist of) 
all of the following: The officers of the Corporation, who are 
entitled EXALTED RULER, ESTEEMED LEADING KNIGHT, ESTEEMED LOYAL 
OIGHT, ESTEEMED LECTURING KNIGHT, and five (5) persons who shall] 
bear the title of Trustee. 
(c) The names and addresses of the persons who are to 
act in the capacity of directors of this Corporation until the 
selection of their successors are as follows: 
NAME ADDRESS 
Samuel T. Fillmore 
William Palmer 
Loy V7. Taylor 
349 North 200 West 
St. George, Utah 
P.O. Box 176 
Mesquite, Nevada 
45 E. 100 Uo. 
St. George, Utah 
Kenneth Christensen 
Blair Turnbeaugh 
Ted Jones 
Vaughn Kelly 
Neal Lundberg 
Harold Furrow 
Howard Hall 
255 North 200 West 
St. George, Utah 
168 North 100 East 
St. George, Utah 
285 North 400 West 
St. George, Utah 
North Bluff Street 
St. George, Utah 
568 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 
Leeds, Utah 
432 West 600 North 
St. George, Utah 
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SEVENTH: That the By-Laws of said Corporation shall define 
the duties of the directors, officers and trustees of the 
Corporation; that the manner of election and term of office of 
the directors, officers and trustees of the Corporation shall be 
as set forth in the By-Laws of the Corporation; that the number 
of persons to serve in the capacity of directors may be changed 
from time to time by the By-Laws of said Corporation, and that 
said Corporation is hereby granted authority to make a Code of 
By-Laws for its government, and to amend the same from time to 
time as provided in said By-Laws. 
EIGHT: This Corporation is organized with the permission of 
the Grand Lodge of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of 
the United States of America, and the business of the Corporation 
and all its acts, decisions and other actions of its officers and 
members in carrying out its purposes and powers shall at all time^ 
conform with the provisions of the Grand Lodge Constitution and 
Statutes of the Order enacted pursuant thereto as well as the 
provisions of State Law. 
NINTH: In all matters relating to property, both real and 
personal, including but not limited to, purchase, sale, mortgage, 
hiring and leasing, the provisions of Section 208, Grand Lodge 
Statutes relating to notice and required vote shall be fully 
complied with. 
TENTH: The term of this corporation shall be perpetual, 
ELEVENTH: The Corporation shall have members and a persons 
eligibility to become a member shall be as set forth in the By-Lawjs 
of the Corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEEEOP, we have hereunto set our hands this Z^jTh\ 
day of October, 1969. 
^ZMry CO J cyX^> 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
:ss. 
•iCKrrr * FICKOT 
ATTORNEY* AT LAW 
'Cr tCC. PICKETT « L O O . 
ST. OKOR6C UTAH 
COUNTY OP WASHINGTON ) 
I, -&AJi)€,-?-/> <£.C6MJT*JLJS**J> a Notary Public, hereby certify 
that on the fO&'ff day of October, 1969, personally appeared 
before me X 9\I UJ'/ Ay /ffc> who being duly sworn by me, declared 
that he is the person who signed the foregoing document as an 
incorporator and that the statements therein contained are true, 
IN WITNESS WHEEEOP, I have hereunto set my hand and seal 
this ^2^7-^day of October, 1969. 
My commission expires: 
EESIICNG: St. Geoige, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DfVlSION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE 
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April 14, 1987 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
As the Official Officer and Secretary of the Utah State 
Senate, I do attest to and certify that the attached transcript of 
HB No. 311, DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX, is a true and actual 
record taken from the Official Senate Recordings, #320, March 8, 
1973. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sophia C. Buckmiller 
Official Officer and 
Secretary, Utah State Senate 
My Commission expires 
May 1, 1987 
Senator Howe: Mr* President, I was just calling 
Representative Urie to see if she wanted to come over and explain 
it [H.B. No. 311] — but, I think itfs rather self-explanatory. 
The purpose of it is, I think, to put into our law, a prohibition 
against discrimination on account of sex. We already have it 
on — that we can't discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
religion, ancestry, national origin; but it was not -
discrimination on the basis of sex was not included, in this 
written law, which was passed in 1965. This is the law, the 
antidiscrimination law really of 1965. Then I note also that it 
includes not only places of public accommodation but in 
enterprises regulated by the state. Now I'm not just sure, 
frankly, what that means, "enterprises regulated by the state," 
but I suppose that it would be — 
Senate President: It's - the explanation is on the 
next page, Senator Howe. 
Senator Howe: Oh. 
Senate President: Line 19. [Pause] Just about 
everybody . . • 
Senator Howe: That's right. In other words, it just, 
applies, prohibits discrimination generally against women. We're 
not doing — discriminating now anyhow so this bill won't hurt 
anybody. 
Senate President: I'm, I'm not sure about one thing — 
can you tell me for sure — 
Senator Howe: About what? 
Senate President: I almost hate to mention it — but, 
the only place I know of, is the Alta Club that has a separate 
entrance for women — 
[laughter] 
Senator Howe: This, this may change that — 
Senator [not identified]: Mr* President • . • 
President: Senator 
Sen-tor [not identified]: Senator Howe, are you open 
for question? 
Senator Howe: I will. 
Senator [not identified]: Senator Howe, it seem to me, 
that on the Equal Rights Amendment, that the place we got into 
trouble was where there might be additional responsibilities 
under the law, to women. Now this pretty well confines it to the 
idea that you can't discriminate against a woman as far as taking 
away privileges and so we're not really talking about the same 
thing here are we? 
Senator Howe: No. This, this is just much, much 
limited. This isn't the whole area like the E.R.A. was. 
• • • • 
Discrimination on Basis of Sex: Hearing on H.B. 311, 
40th Leg., 1973 Utah Laws 33 (statements of Sen. Warren E. Pugh, 
President, and Sen. Richard C. Howe). 
16-6-22. General powers. 
Each nonprofit corporation shall have power: 
(1) to have perpetual succession by its corporate name unless a limited 
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation. 
(2) to sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name. 
(3) to have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to 
use the same by causing it, or a facsimile thereof, to be impressed or 
affixed or in any other manner reproduced. 
(4) to purchase, take, receive, lease, take by gift, devise or bequest, or 
otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with 
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated. 
(5) to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and oth-
erwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets. 
(6) to lend money to its employees other than its officers and trustees. 
(7) to purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, 
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose 
of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or 
obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, whether for profit 
or not for profit, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct or 
indirect obligations of the United States, or of any other government, 
state, territory, governmental district or municipality or of any instru-
mentality thereof. 
(8) to make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates 
of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and 
other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge 
of all or any of its property, franchises* and income. 
(9) to lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its 
funds, and take and hold real and personal property as security for the 
payment of funds so loaned or invested. 
(10) to conduct its affairs, transact its business, carry on its operations, 
and have offices and exercise the powers granted by this act in any state, 
territory, district, or possession of the United States, or in any foreign 
country. 
(11) to elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and de-
fine their duties and fix their compensation. 
(12) to make and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its 
articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the administra-
tion and regulation of the affairs of the corporation. 
(13) unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, to make 
donations for the public welfare or for religious, charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes; and in time of war to make donations in aid of war 
activities. 
(14) to indemnify any trustee or officer or former trustee or officer of 
the corporation, or any person who may have served at its request as a 
trustee, director or officer of another corporation, whether for profit or not 
for profit, against expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in 
connection with the defense of any action, suit or proceeding in which he 
is made a party by reason of being or having been such trustee, director or 
officer, except in relation to matters as to which he shall be adjudged in 
such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in 
the performance of duty; but such indemnification shall not be deemed 
exclusive of any other rights to which such trustee, director or officer may 
be entitled, under any bylaw, agreement, vote of the governing board or 
members or otherwise. 
(15) to voluntarily dissolve and distribute its assets in accordance with 
the provisions of this act. 
(16) to have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect 
any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, includ-
ing the right to raise funds by such means or methods as the governing 
board may deem advisable, not inconsistent with law or its articles of 
incorporation or bylaws. 
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Utah Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Period effective 
07/01/89 TO 06/30/90 
License No, 
CLOO65 
THIS LICENSE ENTITLES St . George Dixie Lodge #17^3* BPOB 
doing business as. 
located at 
Elks 17143 
1225 No, 600 W« 
St . Georget UT 8U770 
TO OPERATE AS A PRIVATE CLUB ALLOWING THE STORAGE, SALE AND 
CONSUMPTION OF LIQUOR PURSUANT TO SECTION 32A-5 , tTCAH CODE 
ISSUED BY THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ON 
THIS 16TH DAY OF JUNE 1969 
This license Is not transferable and shall be 
conspicuously displayed in licensed premises. 
UTAH DE*ARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONtKOL 
DIRE' gr 
1) This license allows the private club to: 
a) purchase liquor from the department and store it in lockable areas as designated 
on floor plan filed with department; 
b) sell and serve liquor to members, visitors and guests at prices fixed by the 
department, provided liquor shall not be sold between the hours of 12 00 midnight 
and 12 00 noon on Sundays and holidays, nor between the hours of 1 00 am and 
10 00 am on all other days, 
c) utilize alcoholic flavorings only as secondary ingredient, which flavorings shall 
be properly labeled and stored in lockable areas. 
2) Financial records, monthly statements and membership records shall be maintained and 
made available to the department upon request The department shall be notified 
immediately upon any change in officers, leases, management contracts, articles of 
incorporation, bylaws or house rules (set up charges). 
3) Renewal of this license requires submitting an application and $750 annual fee by 
May 31, 1990, otherwise said licence will be automatically forfeited effective 
June 30, 1990. 
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MEMORANDUM #1 
To: Utah State Legislature 
From: Utah Liquor Control Commission 
Date: January 9. 1985 
Re: B. No.
 f Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, 
1985# General Session. 
This memorandum has been prepared to highlight and explain the 
attached proposed legislation revising Utah's present Liquor Con-
trol Act, Title 32 of the Utah Code, and Utah's Non-profit Pri-
vate Club Act, Sections 16-6-12.1 through 17. A second memoran-
dum covering the legislation chapter by chapter is separately 
attached. 
Legislative History of Utah's Liquor Lavs 
Most of the existing law today governing the control and regula-
tion of the sales, storage and consumption of liquor and other 
alcoholic products in the state was enacted In 19351 following 
the repeal of prohibition. This basic law has been the subject 
of numerous minor amendments over the years dealing mainly with 
the internal functioning of the commission. The majority of 
these have concerned raising the taxes on beer and liquor, ad-
Justing fees and operating budgets, allocating the revenues from 
liquor sales, creating a director of liquor control, either in-
creasing or decreasing the size of the commission and modifying 
Its duties, creating a citizens' council and a liquor law en-
forcement division of public safety. Some major amending efforts 
have occurred Including the provision for non-profit private 
locker clubs In 1955# eliminating the use of private permits by 
(g) Adopting, as far as applicable, the much more com-
prehensive forfeiture procedures of Utah's present Con-
trolled Substance Act for forfeiting to the state al-
coholic products or property used in violation of this 
•ct; 
(h) Clearly identifying those prosecuting agencies 
having the responsibility for initiating prosecutions 
under this act and delineating how such prosecutions 
are initiated; 
(10) Providing a dram shop act which, unlike present law, clear-
ly covers all alcoholic beverages (including 3-2 percent by 
weight beer). 
(11) Establishing a bureau within the department of public safe-
ty responsible for the enforcement of this act; 
(12) Adopting a standard form of weights and measures utilized 
by the federal government in describing alcoholic products, to 
wit: percent of alcohol by volume rather than by weight. Thus, 
*3-2 beerM is now referred to as beer having k.O percent of al-
cohol by volume. 
The commission has endeavored throughout this legislation to pre-
serve, wherever possible, the substantive provisions of Utah's 
present liquor laws and, as stated earlier, has retained the 
overall philosophy and policies of those laws. Indeed, it is the 
commission's view that it is an entity of government having the 
duty to enforce the laws presented to it by the Legislature, and 
should avoid becoming involved In disputes over what the sub-
stance of the law should or should not be. Such efforts are bet-
ter left to the various factions of the community interested in 
and affected by liquor control. However, during the course of 
preparing this legislation, the commission encountered some areas 
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cf the present law where some substantive change would clearly 
improve the administration and effectiveness of the overall law. 
Father than defer action in hopes that the amending process might 
sake the needed improvements at a later time, the commission 
chose to incorporate them into this legislation, but did ao most 
cautiously and only where it felt the effectiveness of the law 
would be enhanced. Those few substantive changes proposed by 
this legislation which are of significance are outlined below. 
Substantive Changes in the New Legislation 
1. The concept that liquor sales in restaurants and private 
clubs are from "state liquor stores" located in an area 
within such facilities which is leased by the state, but 
operated by a vendor associated with the restaurant or club, 
has been eliminated in favor of a licensing system with in-
creased and more direct regulation of the licensee. The new 
system results in a tightening of existing law and more 
closely resembles the actual administrative practice of the 
present commission. The "state store in restaurants and 
clubs" concept originated in the 1969 amendments to au-
thorize the sale of liquor in such facilities, yet still 
give the state a degree of control over the liquor outlet so 
that the state could, at will, and with or without cause, 
close "its" outlet and remove "its" liquor. 
As a practical matter, this concept adds a non-essential 
administrative burden on the department, causes duplicated 
paperwork in the authorization and regulation of such out-
lets, and requires the use of artificial lease agreements 
between the state and auch facilities. 
All clubs where liquor is consumed are required under pres-
tnt law to have licenses from the commission to allow the 
storage and consumption of liquor on their premises. Res-
taurants must obtain local government approval before they 
can apply to the commission to have a "state store" on their 
premises which virtually always includes obtaining a local 
atorage and consumption license. (See U.C.A., Sections 10-
8-*J2 and 10-13*6). Thus, restaurants and clubs having so-
called "state stores" on their premises from which liquor 
sales nay be made are licensed anyway and the vendor of that 
atore is usually the same person or entity accountable under 
the license. The commission, in fact, now issues state 
store leases and liquor consumption licenses to clubs in 
tandem, and almost always suspends or revokes the consump-
tion and storage license in tandem with the state store 
lease where a violation of the act has occurred. However, 
recently the commission sought to summarily remove "its" 
state store from a private club pursuant to the concept that 
it was really closing its own store and removing its own 
liquor. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that despite the lan-
guage of the act, the club nevertheless had a property 
interest in having the state store located on its premises, 
and held that the club was entitled to a modicum of pro-
cedural due process before the state could close and remove 
the state store. See Celebrity Club, Inc., vs. ULCC. Utah, 
657 P.2d 1292 (1982). 1 
Thus, the State's only effort to assert the legal distinc-
tion between the license Issued to a club (which admittedly 
carries with it a limited property interest once Issued) and 
the leasing of apace within a club for a state store (to 
avoid the assertion of a property interest by the club in 
the outlet) has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
1
 The club has also filed a civil rights suit in federal court 
against the commission for its summary action which is presently 
pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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The "atate atore" concept also requires the commission to 
Bake nominal monthly lease payments to restaurants and clubs 
throughout the atate to pay for the apace within the prem-
ises where the atate atore is located. While the cost is 
nominal, it adds to the administrative paperwork of the 
agency. Also the lease arrangement creates questions of 
liability when thefts, damage, etc., occur, and could create 
similar liability questions under the Dram Shop provisions. 
(Confusion is created over who really owns and has control 
over the liquor.) 
The new legislation has dropped the "state store" concept in 
favor of regulating the sales outlets in restaurants and 
clubs under a single license which authorizes the storage, 
consumption * and sales of liquor on the premises. The 
operational restrictions on the restaurants and clubs has 
been increased to give the commission greater regulatory 
control over such licensees. In the event a violation is 
found after due process has been accorded to the licensee, 
the license is suspended or revoked which necessarily leads 
to the removal of the liquor from the premises among other 
sanctions. No leases are required under this system, and 
the state has really not lost any real degree of actual con-
trol over the outlet. 
Finally, this system does not convert Utah from a control 
atate to a so-called license state. In fact, all control 
states utilize this license system. A true license state is 
• Consumption of liquor in restaurants would still be permis-
sible without a license from the atate if authorized by local 
luihority. However, atorage and sales would have to be au-
thorized by a state license as a aubstitute for the state's con-
trol under the Matate store" concept. Arguably, with the added 
restrictions on operation under the new legislation, the extent 
>f atate control would actually increase over that of present 
Law. 
for summary judgment at pp. 13-14. 
(B) If yes, please describe method. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 62(A). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 63: (A) Does defendant publish a 
directory of its.members? 
ANSWER: No. 
(B) If so, please describe. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(AA) ,Does defendant maintain a directory of JLts members? 
ANSWER; Yes. 
(BB) If so, please describe. 
ANSWER; The secretary of .-the defendant lodge maintains 
such a directory. The director contains the-.name of each member 
address, and phone number. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 64: (A) How many members belonged to 
the defendant on the first day of the calendar year (or the first 
day of the defendant's fiscal yea^) i n : 
(a) 1989 
ANSWER: 1,056. 
)b) 19S8 
ANSWER: 1,012. 
(c) 1987 
ANSWER: 996. 
(d) 1986 
ANSWER: 972. 
(e) 1985 
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ANSWER: 829. 
(f) 1984 
ANSWER: 762. 
(g) 1983 
ANSWER: 710. 
(h) 1982 
ANSWER: 703. 
(i) 1981 and, 
ANSWER: 701. 
(j) 1980. 
ANSWER: 666. 
(B) In answering the foregoing did defendant use 
calendar or fiscal year? 
ANSWER: Defendant used a fiscal year. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 65; What benefit(s), if any, does a 
person secure when he becomes a member of the defendant 
organization? Please describe. 
ANSWER: A person secures no benefit from becoming a 
member of the defendant lodge, other than the privilege of 
association with fellow members. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 66: Please set forth and describe all 
and any documents used in answering these interrogatories. 
Identify them with sufficient specificity that plaintiff can make 
a request for production of documents and defendant will 
understand what is being requested. 
ANSWER: Documents used by defendant in answering these 
interrogatories have either been referred to in the particular 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 43: (A) Please set forth the total 
number of members belonging to defendant's club as of January l, 
1989. 
ANSWER: 1,056, as of the end of the fiscal year March 
31, 1989. 
(B) Please set forth the total number of members 
belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in Utah 
as of January 1, 1989. 
ANSWER: 9,875, as of March 31, 1989. 
(C) Please set forth the total number of members 
belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in the 
United States as of January 1, 1989. 
ANSWER: 1,475,028, as of March 31, 1989. 
(AA) Please set forth the total number of members 
belonging to defendant's club as of January 1, 1988. 
ANSWER: 996, as of March 31, 1988. 
(BB) Please set forth the total number of members 
belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in Utah 
as of January 1, 1988. 
ANSWER: 10,361, as of March 31, 1988. 
(CC) Please set forth the total number of members 
belonging to the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks in the 
United States as of January 1, 1988. 
ANSWER: 1,500,665, as of March 31, 1988. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 44: (A) Is there any limit on the 
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t o t a l number of members t h a t may belong to the defendant 
o r g a n i z a t i o n ? 
ANSWER: No. 
(B) If yes, what? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(C) If yes, at what number would defendant reject a 
fully qualified member? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(D) Who or what entity set that limit? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(E) What is the reason for that limit? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 45: (A) Has the defendant ever taken 
affirmative steps in acquiring new members, e.g. membership 
drive, advertising for new members, encouraging members to find 
new prospective members, offering special incentives to join? 
ANSWER: Although every member is encouraged to invite 
friends to join, no incentives are offered to join, the defendant 
lodge does no advertising for new members, the defendant lodge 
engages in no membership drivers. 
(B) If yes, describe in detail giving dates, nature of 
action, etc. 
ANSWER: Encouragement given to lodge members to invite 
friends to join the defendant lodge is given by speakers at 
various Elk meetings. 
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(C) What is the approximate size in square feet of 
defendant's lodge? 
ANSWER: See defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 2(b) 
of plaintiff's first set of interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 59. (A) How many people does 
defendant employ in maintaining the lodge? 
ANSWER: Defendant employs three persons in maintaining 
the lodge. 
(B) How many people does defendant employ in operating 
the lodge? 
ANSWER: Defendant employs 22 persons in operating the 
lodge. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 60: (A) How many people does 
defendant employ generally? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not understand the difference 
between "employ generally" and "employ on the average", however, 
defendant states that its activities are seasonal, with activities 
during the fall and winter months being more numerous than those 
during the months of spring and summer. Usually, defendant 
employs from 20 to 25 persons during the spring and summer months, 
and 25 to 30 persons during the fall and winter months. 
(AA) How many people does defendant employ on 
the average? 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 60(A). 
(B) How many people does defendant employ generally and 
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pay wages to? 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 60(A). 
(C) How many people does defendant employ on the average 
and pay wages to? 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 60(A). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 61: (A) Does the defendant maintain 
any list of its members which sets out the member's business, 
trade or profession? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
(B) If so, please describe. 
ANSWER: The list maintained by defendant contains a 
members' trade or profession so defendant can refer to the list 
when a particular activity requires special expertise, i.e., 
volunteer maintenance work needed on the lodge building, 
construction of the rodeo grounds, etc. 
(C) Please list, describe and set forth any information 
pertaining to any members' professions, trades, occupations, 
businesses or any other commercial endeavor of defendant's members 
maintained by the defendant. 
ANSWER: Defendant does not possess any information 
pertaining to any members' professions, trades, occupations, 
businesses or any other commercial endeavor. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 62: (A) Is the general background of 
each prospective member checked as part of the application 
process? 
ANSWER: See defendant's brief in support of its motion 
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questions on the written application form. List year separately 
in your answer. 
ANSWER: Defendant does not keep records of any such 
statistics. Persons who may have personal knowledge of such 
information include Jim Rayburn, Chairman of the defendant lodge 
investigative committee; also see Answer to Interrogatory 3(b). 
(B) How many non-qualified applicants were denied 
membership each year during 1985 - 1988 inclusive? List each year 
separately. "Nonqualified applicants'1 means that they did not 
meet the written criteria nor appropriately answer the questions 
on the written application form. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 17(A). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: (A) Is each prospective memberfs 
application checked for verity as part of the application process? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
(B) If yes, please describe the method used. 
ANSWER: See Nial McClellan affidavit at paragraph 3, pp. 
2-3. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19. (A) Does defendant provide 
regular meal service? 
ANSWER: See defendant's response to number 10(b) of 
plaintiff's second set of requests for admissions. 
(B) Does defendant provide any meal service? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
(C) Are any food products provided to members by 
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defendant? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: With regard to the preceding 
interrogatory, please state: 
(a) All facts upon which defendant bases the 
response(s); 
ANSWER: See Nial McClellan's affidavit generally, also 
defendant provides meal service at conventions, district deputy 
meetings and state association meetings. 
(b) The names and addresses of all persons who have 
personal knowledge of such facts; 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 3(b). 
(c) The names and addresses of all persons whom 
defendant intends to call as witness at trial in the instant case 
to, testify concerning such facts. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 3(c). 
(d) Currently, how many meals are served each week by 
the defendant? 
ANSWER: Four meals per week, provided to members and 
their guests only. 
(e) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Monday? Please describe. 
ANSWER: No. 
(f) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Tuesday? Please describe. 
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ANSWER: No. 
(g) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Wednesday? Please describe. 
ANSWER: Defendant provides a Wednesday night steak fry 
for members and their guests only. 
(h) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Thursday? Please describe. 
ANSWER: No. 
(i) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Friday? Please describe. 
ANSWER: Defendant provides a Friday night dinner for 
members and their guests only. 
(j) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Saturday? Please describe. 
ANSWER: Defendant provides a Saturday night dinner for 
members and their guests only* 
(k) Does the defendant regularly serve meals each 
Sunday? Please describe. 
ANSWER: Defendant provides a Sunday brunch for members 
and their guests only. 
(1) For each week during the one year preceding June 1, 
1989, please state the average number of individual meals served 
by the defendant. 
ANSWER: No such records are kept by defendant, 
(m) During the first five months of 1989 did the 
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2. 21 years of age or older; 
3. Have a belief in God; 
4. Never committed a crime; 
5. Be a non-communist; 
6. Be sponsored for membership by at least 
two members of the defendant organization; 
7. Uphold the Constitution and laws of the 
United States of America; 
8. Be willing to pledge allegiance to the 
United States and to salute the United States flag; 
9. Be of good character; and 
10. Must promote fellowship amongst the 
members of the defendant organization, 
(b) $60.00. 
(c) $75.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: (a) For each defendant 
organization, please set forth and describe the facilities 
available for use by members at each lodge — such as reception 
hall, dining area, dance floor, meeting rooms, kitchen, office 
space, lounge, bar, etc. 
(b) With regard to the use of such facilities by a 
member of the defendant organization, please set forth the 
procedure for a member to arrange to use the facility. (That is, 
if a member wants to have his daughter's wedding reception at the 
Elks Lodge how does he go about arranging that, what are the 
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costs, if anything, etc.) 
(c) What restrictions if any, are placed by the 
defendants upon the use of said facilities by a member. (Such as, 
an admission fee cannot be charged; if liquor is served if must be 
purchased from the lodge*s private liquor club; no one under 
twenty-one years can attend, etc.) 
ANSWER: (a) Dining area, dance floor, meeting rooms, 
kitchen, office space, lounge and bar. 
(b) A person desiring to use any of defendant 
organization's facilities must first be sponsored by a member of 
the organization. He then makes a reservation with the person on 
duty at the office of defendant organization. Defendant 
organization determines the amount of rent to be paid by 
determining a per-person charge. This amount is calculated in an 
effort to cover the costs of providing the facility and services 
only. Also, food is provided by defendant organization if 
requested. 
(c) No one under 21 years of age can enter the 
bar. Any non-member wishing to use the facilities must have a 
valid Elks identification card. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Question to the ST. GEORGE-DIXIE 
LODGE only: 
(a) Why was the named plaintiff rejected for member-
ship? 
(b) Who contacted the members of the Elks listed as 
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(a) the number of patrons of the facilities of the 
defendant; 
(b) the number of these patrons who were members of 
the defendant organization; 
(c) the number of these patrons who were guests of 
members of the defendant organization. 
ANSWER: (a) Unknown, no records of this type are kept. 
(b) See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a). 
(c) See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 35: For each of the defendant 
organizations, for each month of the calendar year 1986, please 
estimate or state: 
(a) the number of patrons of the facilities of the 
defendant; 
(b) the number of these patrons who were members of 
the defendant organization; 
(c) the number of these patrons who were guests of 
members of the defendant organization. 
ANSWER: (a) Unknown, no records of this type are kept. 
(b) See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a). 
(c) See Answer to Interrogatory 32(a). 
INTERROGATORY NO. 36: For each of the defendant 
organizations, for each month of the calendar year 1987, please 
state the names of all organizations that used the defendant's 
facilities for meetings, luncheons, etc. That is, did the Rotary 
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Club have a luncheon at your lodge? 
ANSWER: The Catholic Church, the Masonic Lodge, the 
local police department, the local bridge association, the local 
golf association, K-Mart and Rocky Mountain Produce. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 37: For each of the defendant 
organizations, for each month of the calendar year 1986, please 
state the names of all organizations that used the defendant's 
facilities for meetings, luncheons, etc. That is, did the Rotary 
Club have a luncheon at your lodge? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not presently recall specific 
names of any organizations which used defendant's facilities 
during the year 1986, but will provide a copy of defendant's 
reservation list for that year to plaintiff as soon as possible, 
if such a list still exists. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3 8: Has a women ever applied for 
membership in your lodge? If so, when? If so what was the result 
of the application? 
ANSWER: Other than Sandra Beynon, defendant does not 
know of any other woman who has applied for membership in its 
lodge. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 39: (A) Please set forth all city, 
county or state licenses issued to your lodge — such as health 
department, charitable solicitation, business, etc. 
(B) List name of license, date of issue and 
government involved. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 41; 
(a) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1988? 
ANSWER: 107. 
(b) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1987? 
ANSWER: 113. 
(c) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1986? 
ANSWER: 104. 
(d) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1985? 
ANSWER: 74. 
(e) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1984? 
ANSWER: 58. 
(f) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1983? 
ANSWER: 49. 
(g) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1982? 
ANSWER: 53. 
(h) How many persons ceased to be members of the 
defendant club during the year 1981? 
ANSWER: 68. 
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(i) How many members ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the .year 1988? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
(j) How many member ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1987? 
(k) How many members ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1986? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
(1) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1985? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
(m) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1984? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
(n) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1983? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
(o) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1982? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
(p) How many persons ceased or stopped going to the 
defendant club during the year 1981? 
ANSWER: Defendant does not have any such records. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 42: 
(a) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1988? 
ANSWER: 154. 
(b) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1987? 
ANSWER: 127. 
(c) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1986? 
ANSWER: 127. 
(d) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1985? 
ANSWER: 149. 
(aa) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1984? 
ANSWER: 126. 
(bb) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1983? 
ANSWER: 116. 
(cc) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1982? 
ANSWER: 105. 
(dd) How many persons became members of the defendant 
club during the year 1981? 
ANSWER: 75. 
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total number of members that may belong to the defendant 
organization? 
ANSWER: No. 
(B) If yes, what? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(C) If yes, at what number would defendant reject a 
fully qualified member? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
(D) Who or what entity set that limit? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. . 
(E) What is the reason for that limit? 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 45: (A) Has the defendant ever taken 
affirmative steps in acquiring new members, e.g. membership 
drive, advertising for new members, encouraging members to find 
new prospective members, offering special incentives to join? 
ANSWER: Although every member is encouraged to invite 
friends to join, no incentives are offered to join, the defendant 
lodge does no advertising for new members, the defendant lodge 
engages in no membership drivers. 
(B) If yes, describe in detail giving dates, nature of 
action, etc. 
ANSWER: Encouragement given to lodge members to invite 
friends to join the defendant lodge is given by speakers at 
various Elk meetings. 
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